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Terrorism remains a major threat to Kenya’s national-security interests. However, efforts 
to combat the menace are hampered by an insufficient legal framework. Previously, 
terrorism-related offenses were primarily handled under the provisions of the penal code, 
with the result that offenders received lenient sentences or even were acquitted. On the 
other hand, efforts to formulate specific counterterrorism legislation in the past were met 
with criticism from human-rights bodies, the clergy, legal bodies, and the public at large. 
This thesis examines the development of counterterrorism legislation in the 
Republic of Kenya. It evaluates the sufficiency of the criminal-justice system, the British 
legal response to counterterrorism as a basis for comparison, and current counterterrorism 
legislation. The 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act marks a great improvement, especially 
in safeguards to the rights of persons and entities. The act, however, still leaves open the 
definition of terrorism and the appeals process for the proscription of entities. This thesis 
recommends further refinement of these clauses and the establishment of stricter rules, 
vesting power under the president and prime minister (similar to the U.K.) with cabinet 
approval.  
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Terrorism is a reality that has left many countries, including Kenya, counting 
losses. The Republic of Kenya, and indeed all of Africa, is no exception to the worldwide 
increase in terrorism because there is a favorable environment that permits terrorist 
operations, including porous borders, internal conflicts, a propensity to failed states, lax 
financial systems, poverty, corruption, and sociocultural diversity. Statistics for 2007 
indicate that “Africa recorded 6,177 casualties from 296 terrorist acts, hence making it 
the continent with the second highest number of casualties after Asia.” 1,2 The highest 
number of casualties—5,379 in 1998—came as a result of the bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania.2   
Future terrorist threats to Kenya are as likely as they have been in the past, 
especially with the military involved in war in the failed state of Somalia. Hence the need 
to put in place preventive and mitigative measures to counter the effects of terrorist 
activities—and the need to examine the legal response to terrorism in the context of 
legislation and policies, to contribute to developing a theoretical and practical approach 
to understanding and dealing with terrorism in the horn of Africa.  
Civil society and watchdog groups have raised the alarm about Kenya’s 
antiterrorism legislation, especially on human-rights grounds. Various observers, 
domestically and abroad, have accused the security forces of heavy handedness in the 
interrogation of terror detainees. Amnesty International accused the government of 
torture, detaining persons without charge, and harassment of families of people 
suspected of terrorism.3 Kefa Otiso argues that the war on terrorism “should not be 
                                                 
1 Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In Search for an African voice, ed.Wafula Okumu and Anneli 
Botha, (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 27, accessed July 10, 2012, 
http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/AFRITERRO071106.PDF. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Amnesty International Report, “Kenya: The Impact of ‘Anti-Terrorism’ Operations on Human 
Rights,” March 23,  2005, accessed August 14, 2012, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library 
/info/AFR32/002/2005. 
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used as a pretext to wantonly violate the basic rights of Kenyans.” 4 He notes that the 
war can only be won through cooperation with citizens. 
The broader question here—of balancing national security with civil liberties—is 
just as prevalent and pressing in the developed world. At the international level, the threat 
of terrorism is similar, and calls for regional efforts to counter the threat. This thesis will 
analyze successful counterterrorism approaches adopted by the U.K in order to provide a 
working basis for legal experts within the Republic of Kenya. In addition, it will compare 
the progress made in Kenya to that of the U.K. 
A. OVERVIEW AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter II analyses the current criminal 
justice system in Kenya to establish whether it is sufficient to deal with international 
terrorism. The aim of this chapter is to determine whether the existing criminal justice 
system can be utilised or enhanced without implementing other legislation.  
Chapter III will look briefly at the United Kingdom’s legal approach to terrorism 
since 1969.  
Chapter IV will look at the Republic of Kenya’s experience with terrorism and the 
law, from the roots of Kenyan counterterrorism in 1952—when the British declared a 
state of emergency in Kenya and branded the Mau Mau freedom fighters as terrorists—to 
the most recent Al Shabaab attacks. The chapter analyzes the Suppression of Terrorism 
Bill 2003 and Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 to point out controversial clauses and 
probable effects in the country’s criminal justice system. The compatibility of these bills 
with civil liberties is also investigated. 
Chapter V concludes that the Republic of Kenya’s legal response to terrorism is 
still in its infancy, as in many other African states. Legislation was hurriedly passed, with 
little input from key civil-society groups and without thorough public debate. This body 
of law is bound to be shaped by the courts (over a long time), due to the amount of 
                                                 
4 Kefa Otiso, “Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery,” 
Kenya Studies Review, vol 1, no. 1, (2009): 128.  
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litigation that will emerge, challenging sentences and illegal actions by law-enforcement 
officers that defy the constitution. This thesis will recommend that controversial clauses 
be changed, and that those that cannot be held as special powers (similar to those in the 
U.K) that can be activated by either the president or prime minister subject, to judicial 
approval. 
B. THE SHAPE OF TERRORISM IN KENYA 
Kenya has suffered three major international terrorist attacks in the recent past. 
The Norfolk Hotel: On New Year’s Eve 1980, Kenya witnessed its first major 
terrorist attack. The Norfolk Hotel, in the capital city, Nairobi, was bombed, leaving 
twenty dead and eighteen injured. Investigations revealed that the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was involved. The group was retaliating for Kenya’s assistance to 
Israel during the 1976 hijacking of an aircraft to Uganda.5 
The U.S. Embassy in Kenya: On 7 August 1998, the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi 
was bombed.6 This attack claimed more than 214 lives (including 44 Americans and 
Kenyan employees in the embassy); more than 5,000 people were injured. 7  
The Paradise Hotel–Kikambala: In Mombasa, a terrorist attack destroyed part 
of the Paradise Hotel, following a bomb blast on 28 November 2002. Fifteen people were 
killed in the Israeli-owned hotel.8 
Although the primary targets of the attacks were U.S. and Israeli citizens and 
properties, the consequences of these attacks were catastrophic for Kenya as well—on 
many levels. According to the Daily Nation Newspaper, the attacks had “grave economic, 
                                                 
5 Raymond Muhula, “Kenya and the Global War on Terrorism: Searching for a New Role in a New 
War,” in Africa and the War on Terrorism, ed. John Davis (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
2007) 48. 
6 Johnnie Carson, “Kenya: The Struggle Against Terrorism,” in Battling Terrorism in the Horn of 




political, and social implications.”9 The United States, Germany, and the U.K. issued 
travel advisories that paralyzed the tourism sector in 2003, recording a loss of $14 million 
a week (tourism employs more than half a million people in Kenya and represents 15 
percent of the country’s foreign-exchange earnings.) Foreign tourists cancelled their 
visits to Kenya’s sunny beaches in Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu and to renowned safari 
destinations—Masai Mara, Tsavo, and Samburu. In 1996, Kenya attracted one million 
tourists, but after the advisories, the numbers declined drastically, thereby affecting the 
whole economy.10 
A marked shift in policy after the 2002 bombings saw the government establish 
mechanisms to meet this growing terrorist threat. The country sought to formulate a 
national strategy to counter terrorism. The minister of justice and constitutional affairs 
tabled the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 (Supplement No. 38 of the Kenya Gazette) 
in Parliament. The bill immediately stirred up controversy, as had the acts that prompted 
it. The bill was further criticized by the Law Society of Kenya and the clergy, who 
claimed it violated the country’s constitution and legalized civil-liberties violations—“in 
particular, freedom of association, the presumption of innocence, right to a fair trial, and 
particularly targeting Kenyan Muslims as terrorists.”11  The Law Society of Kenya and 
civil society and watchdog groups organized protests across the country, sensitizing 
Kenyans to the negative clauses of the bill. Ultimately, the 2003 bill lapsed after 
parliament was prorogued, and failed the second reading. In 2006, another antiterrorism 
bill was proposed, but never made it to parliament.12  
In mid-October 2011, Kenya deployed its defense force in Somalia in retaliation 
for the abduction and murder of two British tourists in the coastal town of Lamu by Al 
                                                 
9 K. J. Kelley, Kenya Seeks 30 billion from U.S., The Daily Nation Newspaper, (Thursday, June 26, 
2003) in Kefa Otiso, “Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery,” 
Kenya Studies Review, Vol 1, no.1 (2009),117–119. 
10 Marc Lacey, “Threat of Terrorism Hurts Kenya Tourism,” New York Times, January 4, 2004, 
accessed August 16, 2012, http://search.proquest.com/docview/432633287?accountid=12702. 
11 Carolyne Wanjiru Kamau, “Kenya & the War on Terrorism,” Review of African Political Economy, 
vol. 33, no. 107 (2006), 133–141, accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4007116 
12 The anti-terrorism bill 2006 was proposed and immediately rejected by the civil society and human 
rights organizations even before being formally introduced to Parliament. Some organizations rejected 
invitations to discuss the bill because they were not involved in writing the document. 
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Shabaab militia.13 The Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group has since launched a series of 
terror attacks in the country.  In September 2012, the minister of justice and constitutional 
affairs introduced the Prevention of Terrorism bill, which was again met with stiff 
resistance from the same quarters—before being passed hurriedly by the parliament. 
Given the current susceptibility of Kenya to terrorist attack, it might be expected 
that a terrorism bill would be introduced, subjected to rigorous public debate, and passed 
without hesitation. Instead, all attempts have been rejected by a broad cross-section of 
Kenyan society, civil-rights bodies, and religious organizations. In the face of deadly 
threat—much of which is not, in the first instance, a homegrown matter—Kenya must 
find the right balance, implementing antiterrorism strategies amid fears of violating 
human rights and damaging Kenyan democracy. Therefore, this thesis asks, what is the 
appropriate legal response that will legitimate antiterrorist measures, amid civil-liberties 
concerns? Specifically, why has there been resistance to counterterrorism legislation in 
Kenya despite the purported “good intentions” of the law? 
C. PROBLEMS WITH PROPOSED AND EXISTING LEGISLATION 
Following the publication of the 2003 bill, the East African Law Society (EALS) 
issued a statement querying the necessity of such legislation. It argued that the crimes 
proposed under the bill are not new and are already addressed under the penal code. On 
one hand, EALS argues that the bill proposes lesser punishments for serious offenses than 
are currently prescribed—for instance, the current penalty for murder under the penal 
code is death, while the most serious offense under the bill would entail “a maximum 
penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.” 14  
 On the other hand, EALS condemned the definition of terrorism in the bill as “so 
absurdly wide as to mean anything and would in its current form include domestic 
                                                 
13 Alphonce Gari, “Briton Killed, Wife Kidnapped by Al Shabaab at Village in Lamu,” The Star 
Newspaper, September 12, 2011, accessed January, 24, 2012, http://www.the-star.co.ke/news 
/article-49805/briton-killed-wife-kidnapped-al-shabaab-village-lamu. 
14 East African Law Society statement on Kenya’s draft Anti Terrorism Bill, May 29, 2003, accessed 
August 17, 2012, http://www.legalbrief.co.za/article.php/story=20030529104589999 . 
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violence, bar brawls, street or school violence.”15 The definition leaves room for wide 
interpretation and can thus be used to victimize citizens or political enemies. Nthamburi 
supports this argument that the bill “rel[ies] on a vague, ambiguous and imprecise 
definition whereby it is possible to criminalize legitimate forms of exercising 
fundamental liberties, peaceful political and/or social opposition and lawful acts.”16  
Thus, the bill would as likely do too little to punish terrorists as do too much to silence 
legitimate political opposition—but, according to these critics, would probably not do 
much for Kenyan security. 
Indeed, EALS concludes that if the bill is enacted into law, it runs the risk of 
being struck down by the high court as unconstitutional. The bill was also criticized “as 
an absurd imitation of the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, the South African Terrorism Bill of 
2002 and Britain's Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001.”17  According to 
Wanjiru, these accusations stem from two clauses in the bill. The bill grants powers to 
foreign governments over Kenyan officials. She argues that Section 34 directs the 
“commissioner of police to avail intelligence and logistical support” to foreign countries 
pursuing terrorists. The bill further directs Kenya’s attorney general to execute foreign 
states’ requests regarding the “tracking down, attachment, or forfeiture of any suspected 
terrorist property located in the country.”18 Clause 37, regarding the extradition of 
Kenyans, raises the same question of foreign influence. The clause was criticized because 
there was no legal framework to safeguard the extradition and, furthermore, because it 
simply allowed foreign intelligence services and forces to operate in the country.19 
The Committee on Administration of Justice and Legal Affairs argued that “the 
proposed bill threatens to tear apart the very fabric of one nation and could offer fertile 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Nevida Nthamburi, “Fighting Terror in East Africa: Less Liberty for More Security? Analysis of 
Anti-terrorism Legislation and Its Impact on Human Rights” (Master’s thesis, University of Cape Town, 
2002). 
17 “Kenya’s Terror Bill Rejected,”  British Broadcasting Corporation, July 15, 2003, accessed January 
24, 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3069211.stm 
18  Kamau, “Kenya & the War on Terrorism”, 137. 
19 Ibid. 
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ground for inter-religious animosity and suspicion.”20 Kenyans have coexisted peacefully 
for years while embracing each other’s religion without problems. The introduction of the 
Suppression of Terrorism Bill 2003 particularly infuriated Muslims, who complained of 
being unfairly targeted by the legislation. Specifically, in Clause 12, Paragraph 2, the bill 
states: 
a person who, in a public place wears an item of clothing, or wears 
or carries or displays an article in such a way or in such 
circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a 
member or supporter of a declared terrorist organization is guilty 
of an offense.21   
This section essentially gives the police power to arrest Muslims wearing 
religious garb. Having gone through two oppressive regimes, those of former presidents 
Kenyatta and Moi, Kenyans feel that such legislation is a step backward. Similar 
sentiments were also aired regarding the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 before it was 
signed into law by the president. The act, which has fewer controversial clauses, was 
criticized for not being aligned with the constitution. Billow Kerrow, a former legislator 
argued regarding the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Bill argued:  
It seeks to limit the threshold required by security agencies to 
secure conviction of a suspect, in obvious contradiction of 
provisions in the Bill of Rights. In most sections, there are 
references to ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ which implies a 
balance of probabilities. This is likely to be abused by the State to 
convict suspects on flimsy grounds without adducing actual 
proof.22 
In light of these issues of context and contention, this thesis will explore past and 
future antiterrorism legislation in Kenya, with a particular eye towards whether the 
existing law offers a sufficient legal framework for combating terrorism—that is, one that 
allows the state to protect itself and its citizens from terrorist attacks, but that also 
safeguards hard-won civil liberties. This thesis argues that the existing criminal justice 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003, 30 April 30, 2003), Clause 12(2). 
22  Billow Kerrow, “Anti-Terrorism Bill Should be Aligned with the Constitution,” Standard Digital, 




system is insufficient to deal adequately with terrorist threats in the Republic of Kenya; 
and whereas counterterrorist measures were recently legislated, human rights are still at 
risk of being violated by politicians and rogue law-enforcement agencies. 
D. THOUGHTS ON TERRORISM AND LEGAL RESPONSE 
Globally, the 9/11 attacks “and the subsequent war on terrorism brought to light 
issues that have in the past lurked in a dark corner at the edge of the legal universe, such 
as how a constitutional regime should respond to violent challenges.”23 Some scholars 
argue that “respecting liberty to the full extent will jeopardize the discretionary power 
which the government needs to guarantee security, and that sacrificing some of our 
freedom rights is a small offer to bring for our security.”24 This sentiment has left 
governments, including Kenya, in a dilemma on whether to “trade human rights for 
security.”25  
Elena Pokalova posits that the dilemma is higher in democratic governments than 
in autocratic regimes. She argues that liberal democracies have a dual role of providing 
security and protecting the rights and liberties of the citizenry. Any antiterrorist policy 
implemented must be in “compliance with the democratic values held by the citizens.”26  
This tension is almost as old as the theory and practice of modern democracy 
itself.  John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government27 discusses the “prerogative 
power vested in the executive branch of the government.” According to him the 
“prerogative power” is: 
                                                 
23 Ian Brownlie, “Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and Parker Reports,” Modern Law Review, no. 
35 (1972), 501. 
24 Transnational Terrorism Security and The Rule of Law, “The Ethical Justness of European 
Counterterrorism Measures,” December 19, 2008, 7, accessed July 24, 2012, 
http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP6%20Del%2012b.pdf . 
25 Ibid. 
26 Elena Pokalova, “Terrorism: The Dilemma of Response,” in International Criminal Justice: 
Critical Perspectives and New Challenges, ed. G. Andreopoulos, (Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 
2011), doi: 10.1007/978–1–4419–1102–5_5. 
27 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Gutenberg eBook, 2005), accessed July 24, 2012, 
http//:guternberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm. 
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nothing but the peoples permitting their rulers to do several things 
of their own free choice, where the law was silent and sometimes 
too against the direct letter of the law for the public good and their 
acquiescing in it when so done… when the ruler applies her 
prerogative power for the public good, such action is considered 
the right thing to do whichever way one looks at it.28 
The “prerogative power” is essential in dealing with situations where adherence to 
existing rules of law would lead to grave social harm. It permits extralegal measures, 
provided they are executed for the common good. Locke posits that any government 
exercising power for any purpose save for the public good is dictatorial and may validate 
a popular uprising to restore “the people’s rights and limit arbitrary resort to such 
powers.”29 When Locke’s theory of prerogative power is applied to counterterrorism, the 
theory seems to support any measure instituted by the government for public safety and 
good, even if it is contrary to the express provisions of the law. This theory seems to 
place a lot of trust in government, that such power will be used for the public good only.  
Today, despite a real and palpable terrorist threat, citizens of many of the world’s 
democracies, including Kenya, seem disinclined to make this assumption. 
In Kenya, ethnic tensions within the state may exacerbate this uneasiness with the 
government’s aims—perhaps with reason. Professor Gross, in his paper, “Security vs. 
Liberty: An Imbalanced Balancing,”30 argues that counterterrorism measures are often 
directed toward a suspect community, whether foreigners or citizens, whom he deems 
“others.” The “others” are considered outsiders who bring or threaten harm to the society 
of “us.” He further argues that the “clearer the distinction exists between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ 
the greater the threats they pose to the ‘us,’ the greater in scope the powers assumed by 
governments and tolerated by the public.”31 This steeply pitched slope might also be 
slippery. The potential for the devaluation or even violation of human rights is 
                                                 
28 Ibid., section 164. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Oren Gross, “Security vs. Liberty: An Imbalanced Balancing,” University of Minnesota Law 
School, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09–42, September 10, 2009, accessed 
July 25, 2012, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1471634. 
31 Ibid. 
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particularly acute in Africa.  And yet, the approach of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 
and many similar measures may run this risk unnecessarily. 
J. Shola Omotola argues that African counterterrorism measures “compromise 
both human rights and national security, since human rights and national security are 
mutually reinforcing.” 32 The violation of human rights through counterterrorism 
measures pushes national security to the margin. According to Omotola, it is better from 
a civil-liberties standpoint to purse terrorism by tackling the source of violence—such as 
asymmetrical power relations, global insecurity, and rising poverty—through increased 
political tensions, human-rights activism, and more radicalized struggle. In the end, a 
polity like Kenya could find itself more secure and more democratic in the process. 
Laws are meant to foster order and create conditions for equality to thrive in. This 
observation underscores the reason that the people’s representatives to parliament (that is, 
politicians) are obligated to pass legislation that supports the people they represent. This 
requirement assumes there is accountability in the process of lawmaking. Politicians must 
strike a balance among the interests of the people they represent—and their religious, 
racial, social, economic, and nationality divides, inter alia—with criticism from civil 
society and other watchdog groups, as a measure of the quality of their legislation.  The 
pages that follow examine Kenya’s record in this connection and offer recommendations 
to foster this careful balance while keeping Kenya secure. The paper will focus on the 
criminal justice system, a U.K case study, and current counterterrorism legislation in the 
country. 
                                                 
32 J. Shola Omotola, Assessing Counter Terrorism Measures in Africa: Implications for Human Rights 
and National Security, accessed July 25, 2012, 
http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ACCORD_AssessingCounterTerrorism_Africa.pdf. 
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II. ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE SYSTEM IN 
KENYA 
Terrorism over the years has evolved in both scope and sophistication, 
challenging the criminal-justice systems of developed and developing states alike. In 
Kenya, for instance, the penal code (PC) does not even mention the word “terrorism.”  
The PC does criminalize and punish several acts that might follow from a terrorist 
incident—murder, arson, etc.—but does not include a specific offense of “terrorism.” 
This chapter analyzes the Republic of Kenya’s criminal-justice system in line with 
universal principles in order to determine if it is sufficient to deal with terrorism. Has the 
country’s system evolved in tandem with the threat of terrorism to the extent that 
counterterrorism legislation is not required?  
A. THOUGHTS ON TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
There is a diverse literature on terrorism and legislation. Some of the 
distinguished contributions have come from scholars such as Peter Chalk, Elena 
Pokolova, Paul Wilkinson, Alex Schmid, Richard Clutterbuck, and Bruce Hoffman.  For 
his part, Peter Chalk argues that “the main purpose of criminal law within the modern 
liberal democratic state is to prevent unconstrained individual behavior from upsetting 
the order of society as a whole.”33 Legal restraint, justly imposed on the government in 
the form of constitutional safeguards, thus forms an integral part of any liberal 
democratic polity. 
One of the most significant discussions in the fight against terrorism is how 
liberal democratic states respond legally to acts of terror. The legal approach is generally 
acceptable because it prevents rogue individuals from disturbing the social order. Elena 
Pokolova argues that the counterterrorism approach allows a state to respond swiftly. She 
cites America’s Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) as an example of 
                                                 
33 Peter Chalk, The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History: vol. 44,  no. 3 (1998), 374 
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legislation that was enacted within a few weeks following a major terrorist attacks. Such 
legislation provides a quick alternative, as opposed to attempts at conciliation or 
installation of security equipment. Counterterrorism measures are also visible for all to 
witness; the public is aware of measures taken by the state because they are publicized 
widely. This approach targets terrorism exclusively. Pokalova argues that “the response 
here is not inhibited by specificities of other groups of crime.”34 Policy makers can 
introduce unique measures different from those applied to other crimes. 
 Peter Chalk argues that there is always a danger of overreaction when liberal 
democracies confront terrorism using law. He states that: “government officials typically 
make radical and unjustified departures from conventional judicial and law enforcement 
procedures.”35 He asserts that there is the danger of deliberately misinterpreting or 
disregarding the principles of due process. According to Chalk, the solution is for liberal 
democratic states to commit “to uphold and maintain constitutional systems of legal 
authority.”36 He states further that “by undermining the very principles of liberal 
democracy, counter-terrorism loses its legitimacy.”37 Chalk explains that, if 
counterterrorist measures are not well defined, controlled, and limited, institutionalized 
policies to counter terrorism might be worse than the acts themselves. It is therefore 
imperative for the state to ensure that strict control of anti-terrorism mechanisms adhere 
to a lucid structure of legal control.38  
Scholars have grappled with the effectiveness of legislation in the fight against 
terrorism. Paul Wilkinson, for example, argues that assessing counterterrorism laws is 
always problematic, because specific legislation can be employed in a very wide range. 
Some laws are aimed at prevention, thereby addressing grievances that affect particular 
sections of the population. Others are aimed at deterring terrorist acts. Wilkinson cites 
laws in various countries, including the U.S., where severe punishments were introduced 
                                                 
34 Pokalova, Terrorism: The Dilemma of Response, 114–115. 





for hijacking aircraft. A lot of laws aimed at counterterrorism deal with protecting human 
life and property, and therefore any legislation enacted empowers authorities to 
apprehend and convict the perpetrators of terrorist acts. He gives an example of laws 
passed in the U.S., namely, extradition laws, the aut dedere aut judicare principle, and 
laws requiring explosives to be tagged. 
According to Alex Schmid, democratic countries are always in a dilemma when 
confronted by terrorism and are torn between laws that are effective or acceptable. 
Schmid argues that measures implemented by a democratic regime have to be accepted 
by society and effective against terrorists. Schmid explains: “It looks as if we have to 
make a cruel choice: do we want to sacrifice some democratic substance in order to be 
effective against terrorism or do we have to tolerate a certain level of terrorism for the 
sake of maintaining the civil liberties and political rights which we cherish.”39 
Richard Clutterbuck asserts that terrorists endeavour to make the system of law 
within a liberal state unworkable. He argues that terrorists intimidate juries and witnesses 
so as to accuse governments of repression. In 1973, in Northern Ireland, trials without 
jurists were introduced to try and curb jury and witness intimidation. In the case of 
witnesses, Clutterbuck argues that it is justifiable for informers to be offered incentives 
and protection when giving evidence against terrorists. In the fight against the Red 
Brigade of Italy, these incentives helped prosecute terrorists in large numbers.40 
Bruce Hoffman et al., also make an analysis regarding strategies and tactics 
implemented by governments around the world in countering terrorism. They argue that 
civil–governmental relations should not be underestimated in this campaign. Responding 
to public interests and concerns is known to have worked successfully against terrorism. 
The contrary is also true, because any government will find it difficult to operate within a 
population that is dissatisfied; intelligence collection is severely hampered, while 
terrorists can exploit the same population through propaganda. Hoffman and Morrison-
Taw cite the example of British legislation in Malaya and Kenya that proved successful: 
                                                 
39 Alex P. Schmid,  ed et al. “Terrorism and Democracy” in Western Responses to Terrorism, (Frank 
Cass and Company Limited, 1992), 15. 
40 Richard L. Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World, (New York: Routledge, 1994), 213. 
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terrorists were offered lighter or commuted sentences for confession and abandoning 
their organizations. Similar strategies were also used in Italy against the Red Brigade. In 
most cases, the government substituted harsh punishments with emergency regulations to 
facilitate operations. Hoffman et al point out that such regulation never met the standards 
of the 1977 Geneva protocol on the protection of victims of non-external war.41 
Governments introducing emergency regulations had to address restrictions to civil 
liberties. 
B. THE CRIMINAL-JUSTICE SYSTEM IN KENYA 
The Republic of Kenya’s criminal-justice system consists of laws, the legislature, 
the courts, the police, and the prisons department. On one hand, Kenya’s system rests on 
a well-developed body of laws and measures, as befits a law-based society. On the other, 
key failings in Kenya’s law and criminal-justice practices reveal flaws in the fabric of 
Kenyan civil liberties—flaws that may rip entirely under the tensions of terrorism. 
According to Crelinsten et al, the word “system” in the phrase “criminal-justice system” 
implies a degree of cooperation and well-meshed coordination among the various 
subsystems that make up the whole.42 Patricia Mbote and Migai Akech argue that the 
Kenyan system is flawed, especially concerning its investigatory and prosecutory 
methods, which are found in the criminal-procedure act. They point out that the system is 
characterized by “wide but unregulated discretionary powers.”43 According to them, law 
enforcers have at their disposal the authority to arrest or not to arrest; to detain or not to 
detain; to investigate or not to investigate; to charge or not to charge; and to prosecute or 
not.44 A cross-section of the criminal-justice system involves policing and the legal 
framework, both of which demonstrate certain troubling aspects. 
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Police functions in the country are performed by the Kenyan police (KP), 
administration police (AP), the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS), and the 
Kenyan defense forces (KDF). The Kenyan police are the lead agency in policing duties 
within the borders, as stipulated in the Police Act.45 The force is the focal point in the 
criminal justice system and plays a pivotal role in fighting terrorism. Their functions 
include “maintenance of law and order, the preservation of peace, the protection of life 
and property, the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, and 
the enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it is charged.”46  
The AP is established through a separate act, the Administration Police Act 
(APA).47 The AP falls under the provincial administration chain of command, answerable 
to the president. Its role is strictly to assist the provincial and district commissioners, 
district officers, and chiefs in conducting their day-to-day chores. The AP’s duties 
include preventing the commission of offenses and maintaining the public peace. The AP 
can arrest perpetrators of crime and are allowed to use firearms. 
The National Security Intelligence Service is headed by a director general 
appointed directly by the president. The NSIS was established in 1998 through the 
National Security intelligence Service Act.48 This organization gathers information on 
threats to national security and intelligence.  
The power to arrest and prosecute rests with the Kenyan police and the director of 
public prosecutions (DPP), who are tied to the provisions of civil and criminal law. The 
police have on several occasions been accused of abusing powers bestowed to them by 
law, for instance, arresting and detaining suspects without following the stipulated 
regulation. Under the constitution, any arrested person must be informed of the offence 
and the reason for his arrest and should be arraigned in court “as soon as is reasonably 
                                                 
45 Police Act, Chapter 84, Laws of Kenya. 
46 Ibid 14(1). 
47 Administration Police Act, Chapter 85, Laws of Kenya. 
48 National Security Intelligence Act, No. 11 of 1998, Laws of Kenya. 
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practicable.”49 On several occasions, the police have arrested and detained individuals for 
up to twenty-four hours without giving reason. In the event that an arrest is made on a 
Friday, they claim that courts and advocates cannot be accessed until Monday.  
The other area where police have been accused is extrajudicial killings. A report 
by the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings points out that in Kenya, the 
“killings by the police are widespread. Some killings are opportunistic, reckless or 
personal. Many others are carefully planned. It is impossible to estimate reliably how 
many killings occur, because the police do not keep a centralized database.”50 The force 
is also perceived by a majority of Kenyans as corrupt; this has been confirmed by 
Transparency International, who several times have ranked them number one in 
corruption among government institutions.51 According to Migai and Mbote, the police 
have long been used by politicians to oppress the opposition. The organization has been a 
political tool of those at the helm.52 
2. Prosecution 
Before the enactment of the new constitution in 2010, the attorney general (AG) 
was the sole decision maker regarding the prosecution of criminal offences. He could 
order the police to conduct investigations on any case.53  The government top brass used 
and misused this aspect bestowed on the AG for political reasons. The AG selectively 
chose whom to prosecute and whom to let go, depending on political affiliation or 
backing. Though the new constitution seeks to improve the independence and 
accountability of the criminal-justice system, the results are yet to be seen. The DPP is 
                                                 
49 The Constitution of Kenya, 1963, Section 72. 
50 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Mission to Kenya, (May 26, 2009), 6. 
51 Transparency International, Kenya Bribery Index (2008), 16–17. 
52 Mbote and Migai, Kenya: Justice Sector and The Rule of Law, 130. 
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have power in any case in which he considers it desirable so to do -(a) to institute and undertake criminal 
proceedings against any person before any court (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence 
alleged to have been committed by that person; (b) to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings 
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now in charge of all state prosecutions. He has no power, however, to discontinue a case 
without the authority of the court and neither can he take over a case without permission 
from whoever instituted it.54 In Kenya, the majority of prosecutions are carried out by 
police officers55 who lack sufficient legal knowledge to enable them go head to head with 
established advocates representing defendants. Advocates quite often poke holes on the 
evidence adduced in courts and seek legal gaps that the prosecutors are unable to fathom. 
The other issue is that most high-profile cases involving the rich have been thrown out, 
while the poor are punished. This has been attributed to high-level corruption among 
judicial personnel and police prosecutors.56 Due to rampant incompetence and 
malpractice, human-rights bodies are leery of how issues of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance are handled in Kenya.  
According to the UN Security Council resolution 1373 of 2001, “the council 
decided that states should afford one another the greatest measure of assistance for 
criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the financing or support of 
terrorists acts.”57  States were also compelled to “exchange information and cooperate to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts and to take action against the perpetrators of such 
acts,”58 regardless of their stand on the universal instruments. In essence, states are 
obligated by the mutual legal-assistance requirements to offer any evidence or 
information to another country, whether requested or not, to combat terrorism. 
The Republic of Kenya has enacted Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2011, which 
specifically deals with bilateral assistance with other states in terms of investigations, 
                                                 
54 The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Chapter 9, Section 157 (6), The Director of Public Prosecutions 
shall exercise State powers of prosecution and may (a) institute and undertake criminal proceedings against 
any person before any court (other than a court martial) in respect of any offence alleged to have been 
committed; (b) take over and continue any criminal proceedings commenced in any court (other than a 
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55 Kenya Police, Force Standing Orders, chapter 48, Section 7 (i). Provide that all police officers of or 
above the rank of inspector are public prosecutors. 
56 Gitobu Imanyara, Systems and Structures Set up by the Government to Fight Corruption: How 
Effective and What More Can Be Done? in Strengthening Judicial Reforms in Kenya, vol. IX: The Anti 
corruption Court in Kenya (icj-kenya 2004), 49,  
57 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373(2001) press release sc/7158 
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prosecutions, and judicial matters.  Part 1, Clause 3, states that it shall “(a) apply to 
requests for legal assistance from any requesting state or international entity to which 
Kenya is obligated on the basis of a legal assistance agreement or not; (b)  regulate the 
rendering of legal assistance to any requesting state, unless otherwise regulated by 
agreement.”59 The act elicited controversy because it does not allow the concerned party 
to challenge the order in court. Neither does it reveal which countries are in agreement 
with Kenya and under what mutual agreement search information is to be shared 
3. The Legal Framework 
The penal code60 makes provisions for substantive law, while the criminal-
procedure code (CPC) is merely procedural law, as the name suggests. A host of other 
laws (and subsidiary legislation) criminalize certain acts or omissions. The consequences 
of terrorism will affect both people and property, or even vessels. Thus, there are 
provisions in the PC that criminalize and punish acts that injure people, property, and 
vessels—but that is by chance rather than design. Furthermore, the PC does not mention 
“terrorism” as an offence at all, in the way it does murder or manslaughter. Still, there are 
many provisions in Kenyan civil and criminal law that, if wholly exploited, could suffice 
in the fight against terrorism. These acts include: 
 The penal code 61 
 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 
 The Banking Act62  
 The Banking Amendments Act 2001 
 The Protection of Aircraft Act 
 The Official Secrets Act63 
 
 
                                                 
59 The Mutual Legal Assistance Act 2011 No. 36 (2011). 
60 The penal code is divided into sections. For instance, offences against the person are prescribed in 
division IV, while offences relating to property are prescribed in division V. 
61 Cap 63 Laws of Kenya 
62 Ibid  
63 Cap 487 Laws of Kenya 
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 The Fugitive Offenders Pursuit Act64  
 The Extradition (Commonwealth) Act65 
 The Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries) Act66  
 The Anti-Money Laundering and Proceeds of Crime Acts 
The crime of terrorism as a whole encompasses crimes that are prosecutable under 
Kenyan law, and which, if applied, could curb the crime of terrorism to a large extent. 
These crimes include, 
 Financing of terrorist activities67   
 Possession of explosive substances68  
 Conspiracy to kill69   
 Murder70   
 Conspiracy to murder71 
 Unlawful seizing or exercising of control of aircraft72   
 Willful destruction of property by explosives73 




                                                 
64 The Laws of Kenya Cap 87. 
65 Ibid., Cap 77. 
66 Ibid.,Cap 76. 
67 Banking Act and the Banking Amendments Act 2001. 
68 The Penal Code of Kenya, Section 235. 
69 Ibid., Section 220.  
70 Ibid., Section 203. 
71 Ibid., Section 224. 
72 The Protection of Aircraft Act, Section 3. 
73 The Penal Code of Kenya, Section 340. 
74 Ibid., Section 234. 
75 Ibid., Section 332. 
76 Ibid., Section 343. 
 20
The 1998 U.S embassy bombing in Nairobi resulted in the deaths of over 
214 persons77 and left over 5000 injured.78 This is murder, according to the penal code, 
and the suspects were liable for murder. Similarly, the suspects who were arrested for the 
Kikambala bombing in Mombasa were charged with murder. According to the PC, the 
penalty for such a crime is death.79  
Under the Explosives Act, punishments are graded depending upon the magnitude 
of the resulting harm. The penalty for the crime of endangering the safety or causing loss 
of life varies from: 
 A maximum fine of 5,000 Kenyan shillings (KES), equivalent to $62, and/or a 
maximum term of twelve months in prison 
 For a negligent explosion where life is endangered, a maximum fine of 10,000 
KES ($125) and/or a maximum term in prison of twelve months 
 For a willful act or omission causing danger to life or property if not resulting in 
death, twelve years in prison with no option of a fine 
 For a negligent explosion resulting in death, a maximum fine of 20,000 KES 
($250) and/or a prison term of two years.80 
Under the Explosives Act, the materials used in the 1998 and Kikambala 
bombings were classified as explosives. The act states that “no person shall keep, store, 
or be in possession of an unauthorized explosive,” 81 subject to certain exceptions that in 
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no way whatsoever cover or explain the possession of the explosives that resulted in the 
U.S. embassy bombings. The Explosives Act specifically provides that the importation of 
explosives without a permit issued by an inspector is prohibited. The penalty provided is 
3,000 KES ($37) or imprisonment for one year, which is seen as too lenient considering 
the intended damage or deaths that might arise from the crime. The persons who 
conveyed or caused the explosives to be conveyed within Kenya without a permit are also 
in breach of the act and could be fined 2,000 KES ($25) or six months in prison. The act 
restricts storage or possession of unauthorized explosives in any premises. Punishment 
for breach attracts a fine of 3,000 KES ($37) or imprisonment for one year. Owners or 
occupiers of premises in which explosives are stored are also liable, unless they satisfy 
the court that they were not aware of the items stored. 
The deficiencies of the criminal-justice system in Kenya have led to fresh 
initiatives and a rise in procurement of private security services. Citizens have resorted to 
handling the law themselves (through mob justice), while the rich have taken up private 
security to guard their interests. According to Migai and Mbote, this results from the 
miscarriage of justice, where police are bribed to interfere with evidence and judges are 
compromised.82  
C. OTHER DEFICIENCIES 
The system is also deficient in the following ways: 
1. Provisions 
Kenyan criminal law does not specifically provide for terrorism, but for crimes 
encompassed by terrorism. Therefore, only some aspects of terrorism are covered in the 
criminal law, which is not sufficient to curb terrorism or give it the emphasis and due 
attention the associated crimes require. This erodes the seriousness of antiterrorism law.  
Some aspects of terrorism, such as funding, are not provided for in criminal law, leaving 
gaping holes for criminals to exploit.  
                                                 
82 Mbote and Migai, Kenya: Justice Sector and The Rule of Law,140. 
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2. No Anticipatory Crimes 
Kenya’s criminal laws do not provide for anticipatory crimes. This means that, to 
a large extent, the effective collection of intelligence would not enhance the criminal 
justice system, because the information collected could not be used to prosecute persons 
intending to commit terrorism. If the criminal laws would provide for prosecution of 
anticipated crimes, the justice system would be a milestone ahead in the fight against 
terrorism. If suspects were prosecuted once sufficient information on the planned 
commission of a crime were foreseen, many of the explosions and bombings in the 
country might be made less severe, if not prevented entirely. 
3. No Reward System 
Rewarding volunteers who give information prompts fast responses that can lead 
to the prevention of terrorist acts or prosecution of suspects. Cooperation is easily given 
when people are motivated, and a reward system would do that. Unfortunately, there is 
no express provision in Kenyan law to reward people who volunteer reliable information 
on terrorism. Even terrorist suspects can be prompted for information on other 
individuals involved in terrorism. Once these suspects volunteer such information, a 
lesser sentence can be preferred for them, or amnesty.  Given the different ways of 
commission, terrorism may be effectively preempted, prevented, and prosecuted under 
proper information given before a terrorist crime or after its commission. 
4. No Anticipatory Criminal Investigation 
Kenyan criminal law does not provide for anticipative criminal investigation. For 
any investigation to commence, a crime must have have been committed or there must be 
sufficient ground to believe a crime is about to be committed. Evidence obtained in the 
latter case can fall under conspiracy to commit a felony, based on the credibility of the 
evidence obtained or of a suspect’s being in possession of such items as would be found 
illegal. This leaves preparation for the crime of terrorism aloof, which can be exploited 
by terrorists, since the law does not provide for prosecution of terrorism or any other 
crime in anticipation. The crime has to have been committed first. Otherwise a lesser 
charge would be preferred if the crime was not committed.   
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D. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND TERRORISM 
Most criminal justice systems (Kenya’s included) are quite ineffective in the 
sense that they respond to a crime after the fact.  This “lag” is particularly problematic in 
the case of terrorist acts, which may have devastating effects if they are allowed to reach 
fruition.  According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
handbook: 
A forward-looking, preventive criminal justice strategy against 
terrorist violence requires a comprehensive system of substantive 
offenses, investigative powers and techniques, evidentiary rules 
and international co-operation. The goal is to proactively integrate 
substantive and procedural mechanisms to reduce the incidence 
and severity of terrorist violence and to do so within the strict 
constraints and protections of the criminal justice system and the 
rule of law.83 
This balance may not be so easy to strike or sustain in Kenya, because various 
government agencies are not configured to deal with the threat of terrorism. They lack the 
capacity to deliver and perform dismally in one way or another when confronted with the 
task.	
1. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement agencies face a daunting task when confronted with terrorism, 
because their response must be within the international human rights framework and the 
rule of law. In Kenya, these agencies have some peculiar issues that render them less than 
optimally effective for countering terrorism. 
a. Investigation 
Terrorism demands specialized investigation techniques that must comport 
with the internal and international legal framework. According to the UNODC, police 
investigation methods that compromise individual rights are only justified on the basis of 
necessity and proportionality. In Kenya, investigation and prosecution procedures are 
tabulated in the Criminal Procedures Act. Investigations have long been criticized by the 
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legal fraternity as flawed. Several cases have been dismissed or quashed on grounds of 
poor investigations, where the court has argued that the evidence adduced does not meet 
the minimum threshold or standards in criminal cases.84 These substandard investigations 
can be attributed to constant transfers among police officers and a lack of forensic 
capability. Police officers often end up transferred without completing investigations to 
the required standard, and in cases where they have completed investigations, they are 
either unavailable or the evidence is still lacking. The minimum threshold of criminal law 
is beyond reasonable doubt, and this can only be achieved (sometimes) through forensic 
investigation and dedication to duty. The police lack this capacity, which cannot be 
tolerated in the fight against terrorism. 
b. Information Gathering 
Intelligence gathering is essential in the fight against terrorism and can be 
conducted through covert or overt sources. Due to the nature of terrorism, intelligence 
and law enforcement agencies need to cooperate with their counterparts in other states. 
Covert intelligence collection has been critiqued, especially when not supported by law. 
Covert actions generally infringe on Article 17 of the ICCPR. The law must therefore 
prescribe conditions and regulations regarding covert collection, all of which must be 
stipulated in detail and implemented without bias. Covert collection methods that are 
currently used against terrorist suspects are wiretapping, Internet monitoring, and 
installation of tracking devices. Apart from laws governing unlawful interference, the 
information gathered must also be protected against arbitrary disclosure. 
The 2011 Mutual Legal Assistance Act stipulates that “Kenya may in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act and any other relevant law, execute a request 
from a requesting state for (a) the interception and immediate transmission of 
telecommunications; or (b) the interception, recording and subsequent transmission of 
telecommunications.”85 This provision has been criticized for lack of safeguards similar 
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to those found in more established democracies such as the U.K., where the court must 
approve any interception.  
c. Arrest and Detention 
Terrorism can be prevented by confining terrorists. In most cases, this 
entails arrests, detention, and imprisonment. According to the “Body of Principles for the 
Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,” the following 
terms are defined as indicated:  
Arrest means the act of apprehending a person for the alleged 
commission of an offense or by the action of an authority. 
Detained person means any person deprived of personal liberty 
except as a result of conviction for an offence. Imprisoned person 
means any person deprived of personal liberty as a result of 
conviction for an offence.86 
The arrest and detention of an individual must be subject to prescribed 
conditions under law. These conditions are also subject to accountability and oversight. 
According to the ICCPR, any person arrested or detained must appear before a 
magistrate, judge, or any competent legal authority.87 He has the right to appear before a 
court for the legality of the arrest and detention to be determined. UNDOC argues that 
there is no “universally authoritative answer to the question of how many hours or days 
the rule of law permits a person to be detained before being charged or released.”88 In the 
words of the committee appointed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), “Pre-trial detention should be an exception and as short as possible.”89 
Essentially, states have been left to determine a period that is as short as possible and 
acceptable to their rule of law. 
In 2006–2007, the government of Kenya was accused by human-rights 
organizations of arresting and detaining terrorism suspects without charge. These 
detainees were arrested between the Kenyan and Somali borders on diverse dates and 
                                                 
86 General Assembly resolution 43/173, Annex. 
87 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 9 paragraph 3. 
88 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 56. 
89 OHCHR Comment No. 8 (1982). 
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none of them was brought before a court of law. It is estimated by the Muslim Human 
Rights Forum that approximately 150 individuals were arrested and only a few accessed 
legal representations, after the forum intervened.90 
d. Interrogation of Terror Suspects 
Once a terror suspect is arrested or detained, law-enforcement agencies 
embark on the collection of more information through interrogation.  Any information 
gathered during interrogation can be used as evidence against the suspect; this is 
generally accepted because interrogations are guided by the principle of presumption of 
innocence. In this principle, the right to remain silent is also understood to be inherent. 
According to the ICCPR, no suspect can be compelled against his will to give 
information.91 In the cases mentioned above in Kenya, the detainees reported ill 
treatment, beatings, denial of medical treatment and appalling cell conditions. The 
suspects later claimed being threatened and labeled as Al Qaeda members, even in simple 
conversation. 
2. Legal Representation and Assistance 
The ICCPR explicitly states that a suspect may by his own volition decide to be 
represented by a lawyer of his choice, but if he is unable to do so, the state must provide 
one.92 Legal representation is acknowledged by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as part of the right to a fair trial. A suspect on criminal charges must therefore be 
accorded this fundamental right. 
In Kenya, before the establishment of the national legal-aid scheme, pro bono 
work was only offered by NGOs in limited specialized areas, such as divorce. Criminal 
cases rarely got pro bono representation, thus denying the accused the right to a fair trial. 
A majority of defendants are poor and cannot afford high legal fees. 
                                                 
90 Kenya and Counter-terrorism: A Time for Change, Redress, Seeking Reparation for Torture 
Survivors. (A Report by Redress and Reprieve 2009) accessed August 15, 2012, 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Kenya%20and%20Counter-
Terrorism%205%20Feb%2009.pdf 
91 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14 Paragraphs 3(g). 
92 ICCPR, Article 14 paragraph 3(d). 
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has demonstrated that Kenya’s criminal justice system is well 
developed under a law-based society. However, when confronted with terrorism, the 
system has had a tendency to violate basic civil liberties. In the absence of specific 
counterterrorism legislation, the country has utilized its criminal-justice system somewhat 
ineffectively. Agencies mandated by law to deal with crime are ill equipped to counter 
day-to-day crime, let alone terrorism. This chapter has also shown that the existing legal 
framework has provisions that can be used to deal with the crime of terrorism. However, 
this is not by design, but by chance. Furthermore, the punishments prescribed under these 
provisions are not commensurate with crime of terrorism that are more devastating than 
ordinary crimes, with larger numbers of casualties.  
The crime of terrorism is ever evolving, and requires an equally evolving tactic to 
effectively deal with it. Our criminal-procedure code is insufficient to address the crime 
of terrorism.   
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III. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S LEGAL RESPONSE TO 
TERRORISM 
The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of fighting the global war on 
terrorism, using both the criminal justice model and the war model.93 The U.K.’s 
commendable successes in quelling or, in the Irish case, at least containing terrorism for 
more than a century, have been tempered by civil-liberties concerns at every stage.  
At the heart of the issue is the ad hoc or exceptional basis on which U.K. 
counterterrorism measures typically have unfolded.  According to Morag, the U.K. has 
“employed a mix of regular legislation, emergency legislation, and military-based 
emergency executive orders.”94 Over time, the U.K.’s legal framework for countering 
terrorism has become more permanent, with several measures becoming “normal,” 
lasting laws.  Still, emergency laws continue to exist. To date, the authority to promulgate 
emergency powers in the U.K still rests with the queen and is enshrined in the law of the 
land.  In her absence, and more commonly due to time constraints, the finance minister, 
prime minister, and secretary of state can issue emergency regulations. However, 
emergency regulations nowadays are held in abeyance, in no small part because of the 
strong preference among lawmakers and the public alike for legislation “vetted” through 
the normal lawmaking process, with full account taken of civil-liberties concerns 95  
 It is in regard to this legislative evolution that the U.K.’s approach to 
counterterrorism has particular relevance for Kenya. First, the U.K.’s historical 
enshrinement of civil liberties can be traced to the 1215 Magna Carta.  Second, the U.K 
has been involved in creating the European Union’s human rights conventions, which 
have shaped Europe’s counterterrorism legal strategies, as well as the U.K.’s. The 
Republic of Kenya was a British colony, and British law forms the basis of Kenya’s legal 
system. Indeed, Section 3 of the Kenyan penal code (before it was repealed by Number 5 
                                                 
93 Peter Chalk, The Response to Terrorism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy, Australian Journal of 
Politics and History: Volume 44, Number 3, (1998), 376. 
94 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
Publication, 2011), 82. 
95 Ibid., 85. 
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of 2003, Section 2) provides that it shall be interpreted in accordance with the principles 
of legal interpretation obtained in England and that expressions shall be used with the 
meaning attached to them in English criminal law.96 Even though new and autochthonous 
laws have since been enacted, the traditions and precedence of English criminal law 
persist, as do certain conventions of thought and expectations about civil liberties in 
practice.  
A. LEGISLATIVE MEASURES AND THE IRISH PROBLEM 
Until very recently, British counterterrorism legislation and executive policy were 
focused on the Irish conflict.97 Although the conflict dates back to 1761, terrorist attacks 
intensified with the rise of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 1913, whose objective 
was an independent Irish republic.98 The resistance ended in 1998 with the Good Friday 
Agreement, which established peace among Irish factions and between Northern Ireland 
and Britain.99 The U.K. enacted counterterrorism legislation specifically targeting the 
IRA problem.  
In the broadest sense, terrorism legislation in the U.K. dates back to 1922, when a 
statute concerning Northern Ireland was adopted. The Civil Authorities Act of 1922 
established some form of control over the unionists in Northern Ireland. The act 
established special offences with higher penalties and distinctive trials without the 
presence of a jury. By 1943, Parliament was empowered with diverse powers to 
“[i]mpose curfews; proscribe organisations; censor printed, audio, and visual materials; 





                                                 
96 The Kenya Penal code, Cap 63, Section 3. 
97 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 82. 
98 The resistance lasted for over thirty years with sporadic terrorist attacks in Ireland and Britain. 
99 Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein, (Syracuse University Press, 2nd ed., 
1999) ,9–12. 
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specified areas, and detain and interview suspects without bringing charges. The statute 
authorized extensive powers of entry, search and seizure [and] altered the court 
system.”100  
Donohue adds that the most influential measure was the empowering of Northern 
Irish civil authority to take all measures deemed necessary to maintain peace and order. 
By 1943, a second act was introduced with minor changes to the 1922 act and remained 
in force until the early 1970s. These acts became the center of attention in the civil-rights 
protests of the 1960s and 1970s.  
Other important legislative measures that were introduced in Ireland include: 
a. 1939 Emergency Powers (Defense) Act  
This act was introduced before World War II. The intent of the legislation 
was to permit the government to pursue the war more efficiently. However, the act 
authorized the infamous arrest and detention charge known as internment, which was also 
reintroduced later in Northern Ireland after the war. Internment was one of the most 
criticized counterterrorism measures ever introduced in Northern Ireland. The act was 
intended to last two years, but was prolonged until it expired in 1953, before being 
repealed by the government in 1973.  During WWII, the IRA held several sabotage 
missions in a bid to undermine a U.K victory. These actions caused the enactment of the 
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1939, which targeted suspects 
who had the intent of influencing public opinion. 
b. 1973 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA)  
In 1973, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) was 
introduced to replace the Special Powers Act of 1922. Like its predecessor, the 1973 act 
was introduced as a temporary measure, but was reviewed and amended—and 
prolonged—in 1975, 1977, 1987, and 1996.  Donohue argues that this act became a 
 
                                                 
100 Donohue, K. Laura. “Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the United 
Kingdom.” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000–05, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000–01,(John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, August 2000), 8. 
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“critical part of the ongoing fight against terrorism.”101 The act reintroduced the 1922–
1943 and 1939 powers. In addition, some provisions were solely enacted for Northern 
Ireland, such as the Diplock courts that allowed executive detention; courts without 
juries; restrictions on granting bail; compelling spouses to appear as witnesses against 
their partners; restrictions on the right of silence; stop-and-search powers for the military 
and police, and scheduled offences.102   
c. The 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act  
While Ireland was subject to the EPA, the rest of the U.K. was subject to 
the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act. This not only introduced exclusion orders into 
Ireland, but also extended the laws to the entire U.K. The 1974 act was also adopted in 
Northern Ireland as emergency legislation and was re-enacted in 1976, 1984, and 1989. 
The act introduced exclusion orders on the basis of a previous law, the 1939 Prevention 
of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act and the 1922 Civil Authorities (Special Powers) 
Act.   
According to Vercher,103 Section 3(3) of the act is intended to prevent 
terrorist acts that aim at influencing government policy and public opinion: 
If the Secretary of State is satisfied that—(a) any person (whether 
in Great Britain or elsewhere) is concerned in the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, or (b) any person is 
attempting or may attempt to enter Great Britain with a view to 
being concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of 
acts of terrorism, the Secretary of State may make an order against 
that person prohibiting him from being in, or entering, Great 
Britain.104 
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It has also been argued that the power of exclusion is an executive rather 
than a judicial function, and that its aim is to prevent and not to punish. However, 
according to Twining, internment and exclusion “have been largely preventive in 
conception but punitive in execution.”105 Vercher echoes Twinning’s sentiments and 
questions the continuing existence of exclusion orders, even though no positive results 
were noted in Northern Ireland. 106 The exclusion orders were condemned, but still 
retained in the 1989 Prevention of Terrorism Act. 
In the late 1990s, the U.K shifted focus from emergency laws to 
permanent laws directed at domestic and international terrorism. The Labor Party had just 
been reelected after a long absence and had been at the forefront in opposing emergency 
legislation, heavily campaigning for permanent laws. Domestic terrorism seemed to have 
eased off following the Good Friday Agreement with the IRA. This coincided with 
several international terrorist incidents in Egypt (1997), a South African hotel bombing 
(1998), and the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (1998). As a result, the U.K 
transitioned to permanent, internationally oriented legislation. 
d. 1998 Criminal justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act  
This act was adopted at an exceptional parliament sitting without the 
normal legislative scrutiny of the house.107 According to Walker, the legislation had two 
distinct purposes intended to deal with political violence, and as such it augmented the 
substantive Northern Ireland Emergency Provision Act 1996 and the Preventive of 
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groups, listed under proscribed organizations that intended to scuttle the Northern Ireland 
peace process. It also targeted individuals suspected of scheming to commit crime outside 
the U.K.108  
In analyzing the 1998 act, Campbell uses five criteria, three of which were 
borrowed from a speech by former Prime Minister Tony Blair, where he referred to them 
as “common-sense criteria.”109 According to Campbell, the first criterion is that action 
taken in responding must be clearly defined. Second, it must be well thought out. Third, 
the legislation should improve the efficiency of terrorism measures already in place. 
Fourth, there must be a need for the measures adopted. Fifth, the measures must be 
compatible with both national and international human-rights norms, thus representing 
some sort of legal obligation. He argues that unless the criterion is adhered to, mistakes 
are bound to be replicated and a miscarriage of justice is inevitable.110  
e. Human Rights Act of 1998  
James Beckman argues that the Human Rights Act of 1998 became one of 
the guiding laws in the U.K’s counterterrorism regime. This legislation was enacted in 
1998 and went into effect in 2000.111 All E.U conventions of human rights were 
incorporated into English law, thereby becoming a constitutional norm. This piece of 
legislation covers pertinent issues regarding the war on terrorism, such as the right of 
liberty and security, and prohibits torture and freedom of association. 
f. Terrorism Act (TA) 2000  
The Terrorism Act (TA) 2000 was the work of a government-appointed 
group comprising the Right Honorable Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Justice Kerr (in respect to 
Northern Ireland) and Professor Paul Wilkinson (conducted a survey of terrorist threats). 
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The resultant paper, “Legislation against Terrorism,” was released on 17 December 1998 
and proposed a new permanent legislation to replace the Temporary Prevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency 
Provisions) Acts.  TA 2000 was introduced on 2 December 1999 and contained most of 
the provisions found in the Human Rights Act 1998. The act’s major departures from 
previous legislation include: 
 The expansion of the definition of terrorism to encompass ideological and 
religiously motivated acts. It covers serious acts of violence against any person or 
property. 
 Application of the act to all forms of terror, including domestic, unlike previous 
acts that only covered Northern Ireland and internal terrorism 
 New powers for the secretary of state to proscribe organizations involved in 
domestic and international terrorism 
 Introduction of the power to permit seizure of cash and its forfeiture at border 
posts 
 Repeal of the secretary of state’s power to make exclusion orders  
 Permanence for new legislation, apart from a few Northern Ireland temporary 
measures 
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The definition in TA 2000113 elicited much controversy in the House of 
Commons. Talbot observed that the definition was so broad as to apply in cases where 
the use of specialized powers was not justified and the offences not clearly terrorist in 
nature. Walker compares the TA 2000 definition with the 1998 version found in the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary provisions) Act, Section 20.114 Citing a review by 
Lloyd in 1996, Walker finds Section 20 too narrow, in that it does not tackle any issue of 
religious terrorism. Further, “the changes in terms of the definition are not tremendously 
significant; rather it is the circumstances of application which are worrying.”115 TA 
2000s definition is narrower than the 1998 version in two aspects. The definition drops 
the alternative objective in Section 20, where it states “putting the public or any section 
                                                 
113 Terrorism Act 2000, states that, “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where— 
(a) the action falls within subsection (2), 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of 
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115 Clive Walker, Briefing on the Terrorism Act 2000, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol12 no. 
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of the public in fear,” because in some instances this may come about as a result of non-
political issues and still end up defined as terrorism. Section 1(1)(b), having been debated 
in the House of Lords, was amended to read “to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public,” and was set to be read alongside Section 1(1)(c), which contains the religious, 
political, or ideological linkage that is absent in Section 20 of the 1998 act.  
Next, the definition in TA 2000 demands a serious level of violence; damage to 
property, interference to electronic systems, etc. According to Walker, despite this, it still 
allows for “endangerment of life without qualification,” 116 for example, protestors 
digging hazard tunnels.  The definition covers several offences and forms the basis for 
other powers, including proscription.  In 2005, Parliament appointed an independent 
reviewer, Lord Carlile of Berriew, to review the definition of terrorism found in TA 
2000. In his elaborate analysis, the review concluded, inter alia:  
There is no single definition of terrorism that commands full 
international approval; the current definition in the terrorism act 
2000 is consistent with international comparators and treaties, and 
is useful and broadly fit for purpose, subject to some alteration; 
offences against property should continue to fall within the 
definition of terrorist acts; religious causes should continue to fall 
within the definition of terrorist designs; the existing law should be 
amended so that actions cease to fall within the definition of 
terrorism if intended only to influence the target audience, for 
terrorism to arise there should be intention to intimidate the target 
audience; the existing definition should be amended to ensure that 
it is clear from the statutory language that terrorism motivated by a 
racial or ethnic cause is included.117 
Following the events of 9/11, several gaping holes were exposed in the 
legislation, thus calling for new terrorism laws to be introduced to cover the weaknesses. 
The post-9/11 terrorism legislation in the U.K. includes the following:  
 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA)  
 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and Terrorism Act 2006 
 The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (CTA) 
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 The Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (TAFA 2010)  
 The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (PFA 2012).  
Key points to note regarding post-9/11 legislations are as follows:  
 The majority of the laws are read in conjunction with, and by amendment of, TA 
2000. The acts were prompted by such terrorist incidents as 9/11, the 2005 
London bombing, and the 2007 Glasgow airport car bombing. 
 Detention of foreigners indefinitely was introduced in 2001, but quashed by the 
House of Lords for incompatibility. 
 The House of Lords quashed the admissibility of evidence obtained under torture. 
 DNA sampling of terror suspects was introduced. 
 The 2006 act extended the period for detention without charge to 28 days. 
B. THE COURTS WEIGH IN 
In 1973, the U.K. joined the European Economic Community (EEC, which has 
since evolved into the EU. Since then, the dynamics of its legislative body have been 
altered in two ways. First, the court’s power to overturn acts passed by Parliament was 
ruled unconstitutional and, second, any law passed by the EU is ruled to be “supreme 
over domestic laws to the contrary in areas within EU sovereignty.”118 The U.K is also a 
signatory to the ECHR and integrated its principles via the 1998 Human Rights Act. 
According to this act, U.K courts are to take account of all jurisprudence of the ECHR. 
While domestic courts may interpret the European Convention differently from the 
ECHR, if the result is radically inconsistent, the decision can be referred to Strasbourg for 
further interpretation.  The ECHR gave leeway for derogation in certain cases where the 
security threat is considerable.   
According to Morag, the ECHR allows for derogation and non-derogating control 
orders.  Derogating orders imply that the liberties of an individual may be infringed,  
while non-derogating orders allow the state to dictate a set of limitations on freedom of 
movement and action.119 The following cases are examples of the relationship between 
the ECHR and the courts.  
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1. Detention at Ports and Airports   
Several complaints arose in the wake of the 1976 Prevention of Terrorism Act. In 
the case of McVeigh, Neil, and Evans v. U.K.,120 the complainants challenged U.K. 
detention powers in the European court in Strasbourg. The three men were arrested in 
1977 while returning to Liverpool from Northern Ireland; they were detained for forty-
five hours for examination, under the 1976 order. During the course of their detention, 
they were interrogated, fingerprinted, and searched, but no exclusion orders were issued, 
nor were they charged with any offence. The European Commission ruled against the 
complainants that the detention did not breach Article 5 of the ECHR.121 The court, 
however, upheld that Article 8122 was breached because two of the applicants were not 
allowed to contact their spouses while in confinement.123  
                                                 
120 Application No. 8022/77, 8025/77 and 8027/77, Bernard Leo McVeigh, Oliver Antony O’Neill 
and Arthur Walter Evans against the United Kingdom, accessed August 30, 2012, Eur.H.r.Rep 829, 
83/1981. 
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procedure prescribed by law: 
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interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
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123 X, Y and Z v United Kingdom, application Nos. 8022/77, 8025/77, 8027/77 (Dec, 8, 1979) 
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In the case of Lytte v U.K., the applicant was leaving England for Scotland. While 
Paul Lytte was detained for thirty-one hours, the European Court ruled as in the McVeigh 
case, where the application was found to be inadmissible. The commission raised the 
point that Lytte had not challenged his detention through a habeas corpus proceeding. As 
a result, the commission ruled that Article 5(4)124 of the ECHR was not breached. 
According to Brice Dickson, the “McVeigh and Lytte cases raise fundamental 
questions about the degree to which in practice the European Convention can protect 
people against arbitrary arrest.”125 Dickson notes that while the European court’s ruling 
did not benefit either applicant, the U.K. legal position was left “internally 
inconsistent.”126 This meant that unless there is reasonable suspicion about an 
individual’s involvement in terrorism, he cannot be arrested on the streets, but can be 
arrested at ports of entry or exit, regardless of citizenship.  
As far as duration of detention is concerned, the court stressed that the applicants 
in the McVeigh case were only incarcerated for forty-five hours. In a previous ruling on 
Brogan v U.K., the court viewed “four days as the maximum permitted period of 
detention under Article 5(3), which uses the word ‘promptly’ in relation to detention 
under Article 5(1) (c).”127 Dickson explains that a strict timeline should be applicable to 
both Article 5(1) (c) and 5(1) (b), even though the word “promptly” does not appear in 
the latter.128  
The exclusion orders were rendered non-operational by Parliament in 1998, 
although, within the statute, these powers could be rapidly reintroduced by Parliament. 
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On the other hand, the port/airport powers were repealed in 2001, when the 2001 
Terrorism Act came into force, thereby rendering sections 53 and 97 and Schedule 7 
operational. [Schedule 7 deals with port and border controls and empowers officers to 
stop, question, and detain persons in ships, aircrafts within the port, and the border areas 
of Northern Ireland and Great Britain to determine whether the person is involved with 
acts of terrorism.129 The schedule further restricts detention for more than nine hours 
unless Schedule 8, 32(1)130 is satisfied.  
2. Shoot-to-Kill Policy 
In counterterrorism, the shoot-to-kill policy has been widely contested and is still 
controversial. Security forces have been accused of shooting terrorists dead to avoid long 
court procedures. From a different perspective, it has also been argued that shooting 
terrorists dead may be the only way of preventing them from detonating a bomb. 
According to Stephen Livingstone, in Northern Ireland more than 350 people were shot 
by security forces in questionable circumstances, though the Army and/or police claimed 
to have used reasonable force.131 Cases of deliberate shooting were raised in the ECHR; 
for instance in Kelly and others v U.K., the deceased were involved in a gunfight on 
8 May 1987 with special air service (SAS) troops at Armagh. Seven families thereafter  
 
                                                 
129 Clive Walker, Blackstone Guide to the Antiterrorism legislation, 10. 
130 Terrorism Act 2000, Schedule 8 32(1) states that, Grounds for extension are satisfied if: 
(1) A judicial authority may issue a warrant of further detention only if satisfied that— 
(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the further detention of the person to whom the 
application relates is necessary as mentioned in sub-paragraph (1A), and 
(b) the investigation in connection with which the person is detained is being conducted diligently and 
expeditiously. 
(1A)The further detention of a person is necessary as mentioned in this sub-paragraph if it is 
necessary— 
(a) to obtain relevant evidence whether by questioning him or otherwise; 
(b) to preserve relevant evidence; or 
(c) Pending the result of an examination or analysis of any relevant evidence or of anything the 
examination or analysis of which is to be or is being carried out with a view to obtaining relevant evidence. 
131 Stephen Livingstone, And Justice for All? The Judiciary and the Legal Profession in Transition, in 
Colin Harvey ,ed., Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland (Oxford Portland: 
Hart Publishing 2000), 150. 
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sued the defense ministry, eliciting a response “stating inter alia that the force used was 
necessary to prevent the deceased from committing unlawful acts and to protect lives and 
personal safety.”132  
Under the Northern Ireland Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, Section 3 
states, “A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the 
prevention of crime, or in effecting the arrest or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders 
or suspected offenders or persons unlawfully at large.”133 The applicants alleged that 
their kin had been unjustly killed and no proper investigation was conducted to ascertain 
how they died. They invoked articles 2 (right to life), 6(1) (right to a fair trial), 13 (right 
to an effective remedy), and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR. The court 
unanimously found that Article 2 was violated while articles 6(1), 13 and 14 were not. 
The respondent state was ordered to pay the applicant’s cash penalties and expenses 
incurred.134  
In other terrorism cases, the U.K was similarly accused and criticised by the 
European court for violating Article 2 of the ECHR. The cases involved Shanaghan v 
U.K,135 Finucane v U.K,136 and McShane v the U.K,137 and in all instances, the U.K was 
found to violate Article 2, which demands effective investigation of the deaths of the 
deceased.  
In a somewhat different case in 1988 in Gibraltar, security forces shot three 
unarmed IRA members who were wrongly thought to be in the process of detonating a 
                                                 
132 Kelly and Others v U.K. Application no. 30054/96, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003–68397–
68865#{%22itemid%22:[%22003–68397–68865%22]} 
133 Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, Section 3. 
134 Kelly and Others v U.K. Application no.30054/96. 
135 Shanaghan v. United Kingdom, Application no. 37715/97, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/652. 
136 Finucane v The United Kingdom, Application no.29178/95, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/493. 




bomb. The case was McCann and Others v U.K., which again found the U.K in breach of 
Article 2. The judge explained that the operation in question was not planned and 
properly controlled in such a manner as to minimize the choice of lethal force.138 
3. Internment and Special Powers 
The government of Ireland challenged the U.K. at the European Court in 
Strasburg regarding internment and the implementation of special powers in Northern 
Ireland. The case, Ireland v U.K., was ruled against the U.K., stating that “this was a 
breach of Article 3139 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR,) and in 
particular referring to inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.” 140  The decision 
highlighted the emphasis of Article 15, Part 2141 of the ECHR that, regardless of 
emergency, states cannot derogate on laws that infringe on human rights.142 
4. Right to Silence 
The 1998 act provides in sections 1 and 2 measures that facilitate the conviction 
of members of certain terrorist groups by limiting their right to silence when coupled with 
the opinion of a senior officer. The groups in question fall under the category of 
proscribed organizations. Walker posits that the strategy in Section 1 turns the police 
officer (above the rank of a superintendent) into an expert witness whose evidence is 
based on experience and judgement and not first-hand, factual information. The 
consequence of such evidence is that, first, it is not backed by any proof, and by virtue of 
the evidence coming from a senior police officer, does not mean that the court should 
                                                 
138 McCann and others v The United Kingdom, Application no. 18984/91, accessed September 12, 
2012,  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001–57943#{%22itemid%22:[%22001–
57943%22]}. 
139 ECHR Article 3, Prohibition of torture: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
140 The Republic of Ireland v. The United Kingdom, Series A, No. 25 before the European Court of 
Human Rights, (18 January 1978). 
141 ECHR  Article 15, Derogation in time of emergency, (2) No derogation from Article 2, except in 
respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made 
under this provision.  
142 Warbrick C, Emergency Powers and Human Rights: The U.K. Experience and Legal Instruments 
in the Fight against International Terrorism a Transatlantic dialogue, ed. JWINC. Fijnaut, (Leiden Boston 
Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 2004), 361–408. 
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accept it. Second, such opinions are easily objected to by the defense. In previous cases 
regarding the 1972 (Offences against the State) Act, Section 3,143 suspects refuted 
association or links with proscribed organisations. As a result, courts declined to convict 
on the basis of such evidence, even though the opinion of the police remained admissible  
in court. According to Walker, criminals would easily circumvent this act by simply 
denying membership. Consequently, there would be no silence from which to draw any 
deduction.  
Third, in the event that an officer’s statement is allowed as evidence, then it is 
liable to questioning, in which case he would be compelled to release techniques of 
investigation plus any secret sources that could collaborate his evidence. This 
complicates matters, because the aspect of immunity in protecting one’s sources comes 
into question. However, if this evidence is still allowed to continue, the judge could rule 
to stop the trial based on ECHR Article 6(1), arguing that part of the evidence is not 
being tested in court.144 Campbell, on the other hand, posits that “the accused cannot be 
committed for trial, or be found to have a case to answer, or be convicted, solely on the  
 
 
                                                 
143 Under the Offences against the state Act 1972, Section 3: Evidence of membership of unlawful 
organization states that: 
(1) (a) Any statement made orally, in writing or otherwise, or any conduct, by an accused person 
implying or leading to a reasonable inference that he was at a material time a member of an unlawful 
organization shall, in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act of 1939, be evidence that he was then such a 
member. 
 (b) In paragraph (a) of this subsection “conduct” includes omission by the accused person to deny 
published reports that he was a member of an unlawful organization, but the fact of such denial shall not by 
itself be conclusive. 
(2) Where an officer of the Garda Síochána, not below the rank of Chief Superintendent, in giving 
evidence in proceedings relating to an offence under the said Section 21, states that he believes that the 
accused was at a material time a member of an unlawful organization, the statement shall be evidence that 
he was then such a member. 
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall be in force whenever and for so long only as Part V of the Act 
of 1939 is in force. 
144 Clive Walker, The Bombs in Omagh and Their Aftermath: The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and 
Conspiracy) Act 1998, Modern Law Review 62, (1999), 884–885. 
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basis of the police statement.”145 He, however, points out that the act does not stipulate 
the requirement of further collaborating evidence and thus convictions may be obtained 
arising from supporting evidence. 
C. SPECIAL POWERS (PROSECUTORIAL MEASURES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND) 
1. Diplock Courts146 
Diplock trials were emergency measures introduced in Northern Irish courts 
following Lord Diplock’s government-commissioned investigation in 1972. The 
commission argued that juries were susceptible to intimidation from a highly sectarian 
society and thus recommended that a single judge sit as both judge and jury in terrorism 
cases.147 Thus juries in Northern Ireland were excluded from the special courts, which 
were conducted by one judge. This approach became controversial, especially because it 
was contrary to the principle of a fair trial and common-law practice.148 Jackson and 
Doran posit that in common-law practice, juries are the “most potent symbol, the fulcrum 
of the adversarial trial system.”149 These measures were argued to be biased 
significantly against the accused and were evident in the number of guilty pleas 
witnessed in Northern Ireland, as compared to England and Wales.150 The Diplock trials 
continued in Northern Ireland until 2005, when the IRA announced an end to its long 
war. The trials ceased in 2007, but exceptional cases can still be heard without juries.151  
                                                 
145 Campbell B C L, Two Steps Backwards, The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 
1998, Criminal Law review, (1999), 943–944. 
146 ‘Diplock’ is derived from Lord Diplock who recommended the introduction of judge only trials in 
Northern Ireland in 1972, (London; HMSO, 1972) CMnd 5185. 
147 BBC news, Diplock Courts , accessed September 12, 2012,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/programmes/law_in_action/6265734.stm, Published: 2007/07/03 14:44:29 GMT. 
148 Jackson J and Doran S, Judge Without Jury: Diplock Trials in the Adversary System: (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 509–510. 
149 Ibid., 1. 
150 Ibid., 41. 
151 The Justice and Security Act 2007 states that: in Northern Ireland, only in exceptional cases, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland will have discretionary power to issue a certificate 
stating that a trial is to take place without a jury if certain conditions are met. 
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2. Supergrass Trials in Northern Ireland 
According to David Bonner, a supergrass “denotes someone who has participated 
in a number of criminal [activities], who not only gives information to the police about 
them, but also agrees to give evidence in court against a significant number of persons 
alleged to be his accomplices in crime.”152 The supergrass method emerged in the 1980s, 
and by 1998, twenty-seven criminal defendants had agreed to cooperate against their 
organizations. Bonner notes, however, that only ten supergrasses remained up to the 
completion of a trial based on their evidence. Fifteen retracted midway, allegedly because 
of threats against family members. Another lot withdrew because their safe houses had 
been discovered by terrorist groups.  
Critics of the supergrass method point out that, first, granting immunity to a 
person who is accusing another person of similar offences is objectionable. Second, 
supergrasses have been accused of colluding with police officers in altering evidence, and 
in some cases, inserting particular names in their evidence. Third, when the number of 
individuals named by a supergrass is too large, arresting suspects takes time and as a 
result, they end up being coached and trained before appearing in front of a magistrate. 
This process easily misleads the judge for lack of collaborative evidence.153  
The supergrass method proved successful at first because it led to the arrest of 300 
IRA members, but later, when challenged in appellate court, the evidence was easily 
quashed. A case in question is the 1986 conviction of eighteen IRA members based on 
evidence from a one of the first supergrasses, known as Christopher Black. The 
convictions were later quashed and the suspects released.154 Another downside to the 
method is that terrorist organisations developed a counter method, where they offered 
amnesties to supergrasses to withdraw their statements and evidence. Despite heavy 
criticism, the method is still applied. In April 2012, a British terrorist who was jailed back 
                                                 
152 David Bonner, Combating Terrorism: Super grasses Trials in Northern Ireland, The Modern Law 
Review, Volume 51, issue 1 (January 1988), 23. 
153 Ibid., 34. 
154 BBC News, IRA Members jailed for 4000 years (1983), accessed August 6, 2012, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/5/newsid_2527000/2527437.stm  
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in 2005 for plotting to blow up an airplane had his thirteen-year term commuted to two 
years for helping U.S. intelligence foil a plan to attack the New York subway.155  
D. SPECIAL POWERS (LAW-ENFORCEMENT MEASURES) 
Terrorism laws in the U.K vary from those that exclusively targeted Northern 
Ireland to those that covered the whole country. Laws covering Northern Ireland had 
broader law-enforcement powers and somewhat different procedures. Even though 
terrorist acts were also recorded in other regions, the major perpetrators originated in 
Northern Ireland. Some of the special provisions that exclusively targeted Northern 
Ireland are tabulated below.  
1. Stop and Search 
Security forces in Northern Ireland had special powers of stop and search that 
were granted by Parliament. The powers applied to any person, without time limitation, 
as long as the search was related to a terrorist incident. Searches of vehicles and premises 
required only reasonable suspicion from the security forces. From 1994 to 1996, the 
provisional IRA intensified their campaign, triggering the passage of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 
1995.  Powers were extended to the mainland and authorised police to randomly stop and 
search vehicles for the purpose of preventing terrorism. These also included measures 
such as cordoning areas for the purpose of investigations without prior judicial 
authority.156 
2. Detention and Wider Powers of Arrest 
The U.K police were also granted wider powers of arrest and could hold suspects 
for longer periods in regard to any alleged terrorism incident. The difference with the 
                                                 
155 Martin Betham, British Terror Super Grass Sentence Cut by Two Years, London Evening 
Standard, (16 April 2012), accessed September 12, 2012, www.stardard.co.uk/news/uk/british-terror-
supergrass-sentence-cut-by-two-years-7647957. 
156 David Bonner, The United Kingdom's Response to Terrorism: the Impact of Decisions of 
European Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland ‘Peace Process'. In European Democracies 
against Terrorism. Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. F Reinares (Dartmouth, 
Hants: Ashgate 2000), 31–71. 
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existing criminal system was that individuals could only be arrested if reasonable 
suspicion existed for a particular offence and could only be detained for up to thirty-six 
hours without charge. This period was extendable to ninety-six hours through a judicial 
hearing. By contrast, the 1989 Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) granted security forces 
the power to arrest individuals if there was “reasonable cause to suspect that the person 
was or had been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism, or after being stopped at a port or airport.”157 In respect to detention, the police 
could hold a suspect for up to forty-eight hours without judicial approval, which could be 
extended by five days with the secretary of state’s approval.158 
Under TA 2000, Section 41(1) “a constable may arrest without a warrant any 
person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist.”159 In Section 41(3),160 read 
together with the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act  (PACE) Annex B (a) (6), an 
arrested person may be held no longer than forty-eight hours after arrest. The section 
specifies that the detainee has a right to a solicitor and to inform a named person about 
his detention. However, after TA 2000 was passed, it essentially granted permanency to 
the seven-day, pre-charge detention provision previously found in the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act. According to Morag, this period was further extended to fourteen days in 
2003, following a rise in international terrorism. The government sought further to 
increase the period to ninety days, but to no avail. In Terrorism Act 2006, the pre-charge 
detention period was increased to twenty-eight days. Under the act, detention can be 
authorised by a magistrate only under certain conditions; beyond fourteen days, the 
authority is granted by a high-court judge.161 
                                                 
157 Ibid., 43. 
158 Prevention of Terrorism Act, Section 14. 
159 Terrorism Act 2000, Section 41 Arrest without warrant. (1) A constable may arrest without a 
warrant a person whom he reasonably suspects to be a terrorist. 
160  Terrorism Act 2000, Section (3)Subject to subsections (4) to (7), a person detained under this 
section shall (unless detained under any other power) be released not later than the end of the period of 48 
hours beginning— 
(a) with the time of his arrest under this section, or 
(b) if he was being detained under Schedule 7 when he was arrested under this section, with the time 
when his examination under that Schedule began. 
161 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 93. 
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3. Internment and Interrogations 
According to Antonio Vercher, “internment is an executive measure, meaning 
detention without trial of persons believed to be a danger to the state.”162  Vercher 
explains that the word “internment” was found in the British legal system, but was 
replaced by the word “detention” through an extrajudicial process. In Northern Ireland, 
“internment” was used during the violence between the Catholics and Protestants. It was 
used as a preventive or extrajudicial repressive measure to curb an intended or ongoing 
uprising and as a political tool to effect a solution with the IRA. The other intent of 
internment was introduced by the Detention of Terrorists Order of 1972, as a kind of 
judicial process that dealt with terrorists who could not be handled through the normal 
criminal courts, either because of inadmissibility of evidence or because of witness 
intimidation.163  
In the early 70s, in-depth interrogations took place that entailed harsh techniques 
such as hooding and sleep deprivation. These techniques were stopped and declared 
unlawful through the 1972 Parker report.164 In 1973, the Emergency Provisions Act once 
again legalized the practice, amid widespread resentment. In 1975, internment was 
abolished through the Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act 1975 (Amendment) 
following the Gardener report on civil liberties and human rights.165  
4. Proscription 
In the U.K, organizations are proscribed by a statutory order from the secretary of 
state and if listed in the act under Schedule 2. Before 2000, proscribed organizations were 
from Northern Ireland, but later, based on TA 2000, both foreign and domestic groups 
                                                 
162  Vercher, Terrorism in Europe, 17. 
163 Ibid., 17–18. 
164 Report of the Committee of Privy Counselors Appointed to Consider Authorized Procedures for 
the Interrogations of Persons Suspected of Terrorism, Cmd No. 4901, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://Cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso.  
165 Report of a Committee to Consider in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights, Measures 
to deal with Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Cmd. No 5847, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso. 
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were included. Section 5 of TA 2000166 established the Proscribed Organization Appeal 
Commission (POAC), which was charged with the responsibility of scrutinizing 
proscription orders. However, Walker points out that a weakness found in the POAC is 
its lack of appeal powers. In Section 5(3),167 the POAC is restricted to principles 
applicable for judicial review. Walker argues that these powers should be vested in the 
POAC so as to allow the organization to consider their decisions. As a result, he 
contends, that there is little difference from the 1989 act, where the verdict of the 
secretary of state was also liable to judicial scrutiny. Another area of concern is the 
proscription of foreign organizations. By virtue of Section 1(2), foreign groups may also 
be proscribed in the U.K. Walker comments that, hopefully, before any foreign group is 
listed, the government should have gathered incriminating evidence of criminal activity 
(including universal offences) within the U.K. 168  
In April 2002, before the High Court of Justice, three separate applicants launched 
a claim challenging the proscription of their organizations under Part II, Schedule 2 of the 
TA 2000.  The organisations in question were the People’s Mujahidin of Iran (PMOI), the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Lashkare Tayyahah (LeT). All three parties were 
proscribed by virtue of the TA 2000 order, and in each instance they challenged the 
lawfulness of the proscription, contending that they ought to be granted an immediate 
judicial review instead of a set procedural appeal through POAC. The case was 
dismissed, arguing that POAC was the right channel through which appeals challenging 
the legality of proscription should be handled.169 
                                                 
166 Terrorism Act 2000, Section 5, De-proscription: appeal. 
(1) There shall be a commission, to be known as the Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission. 
167 Terrorism Act 2000 Section 5(3,) The Commission shall allow an appeal against a refusal to de-
proscribe an organization if it considers that the decision to refuse was flawed when considered in the light 
of the principles applicable on an application for judicial review. 
168 Clive Walker, Briefing on the Terrorism Act 2000, Terrorism and Political Violence, 12:2(2000), 
15–17, accessed August 24, 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550008427559. 
169 Application Nos: co/2587/2001,co/4039/2001 and co/878/2002, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/erg/pages/search.aspx?!=001–57721.  
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E. REPEAL OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND EMERGENCY 
PROVISIONAL ACT 1978 
The ECHR persistently condemned the U.K regarding the Northern Ireland EPA 
Act 1978 and, in particular, sections 11 and 14, which dealt with provisions regulating 
arrest. The U.K eventually repealed the act in August 1991. In a suit against the U.K. 
launched by Fox, Campbell, and Hartley, the applicants alleged a violation of Article 5(1) 
of the ECHR. Under Section 1(1) of the 1978 act,  “any constable may arrest without a 
warrant any person whom he suspects of being a terrorist.”170 The applicants did concur 
with their arrest as being lawful under Section 11(1), but argued that their arrest and 
detention were not based on reasonable suspicion, thus contradicting Article 5(1)(c). The 
article contains the phrase “reasonable suspicion,” which the court argued safeguards 
against random arrest and detention and assumes the existence of factual information that 
satisfies a third party that the arrested person is in violation of the law. Ultimately, the 
ECHR ruled that Article 5(1) was breached. 
The 1978 provision was eventually repelled and the Northern Ireland Emergency 
provision Act 1991 adopted. In Brennan v U.K., filed with the ECHR, the applicant 
complained of having been denied access to his lawyer in his initial period of arrest and 
not being able to see him in private, thus depriving him of a fair trial. Section 45(1) of the 
1991 act provides that an arrested person can access a lawyer in the presence of a 
uniformed policeman only. Brennan was arrested on 21 October 1990 for the murder of 
an Ulster soldier. He was interviewed and held until 25 October 1990. The applicant was 
allowed to see his solicitor on 23 October, at which time there was a uniformed 





                                                 
170 Application no. 12244/86, 12245/80 and 122383/86, accessed September 12, 2012, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/erg/pages/search.aspx?!=001–57721. 
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deals with the individual’s right to a solicitor.171 The government of the U.K relied on 
Section 45 to deny him access to a lawyer. However, the applicant argued that he could 
not see his solicitor for a whole day, and that in his initial confessions, no legal advice 
was provided. He cited this as a breach of Article 6(1)172 and Article 6(3)(c)173 of the  
convention. The court held that a violation of the two articles was committed and  
thus the state was required to pay the applicant for costs and expenses to the tune of 
6,920.62 pounds sterling.174 
F. CONCLUSION 
Anti-terrorism laws in the U.K were initially enacted specifically to target 
domestic terrorism, but were extended to international terrorism in the late 1990s. The 
U.K employed emergency legislation, regular legislation, and law-enforcement 
emergency executive orders in its legal framework for combating terrorism. Special 
legislation included prosecutorial measures (such as the Diplock courts), law-
enforcement measures (such as extended detentions and increased security-force powers), 
                                                 
171 Northern Ireland Emergency Provision Act 1991 states that: 
A person who is detained under the terrorism provisions and is being held in police custody shall be 
entitled if he requests, to consult a solicitor privately. 
A person shall be informed of the right conferred on him by subsection (1) as soon as practicable after 
he has become a person to whom the subsection applies. 
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delay is permitted by this section. 
172 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6 (1), Right to a fair trial.  
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
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173 European Convention on Human Rights ,Article 6(3)(c):  
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
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and other temporary provisions. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, several laws were 
introduced hurriedly that infringed on human rights.  
According to Oehmichen, U.K. terror legislation has been found to limit the 
following human rights: “Right to liberty of movement (extended policy custody and 
detention on remand); inviolability of the home (house searches, bugging operations); 
right of privacy (telephone tapping); freedom of association; prohibition of 
discrimination/equality before the law (special treatment of foreigners).”175 These 
human-rights violations have been dealt with by both the domestic and EU courts and 
have gradually shaped the state’s response. In essence, the judiciary has kept the state 
under check in regards to executive powers and human-rights violations. 
The U.K has had extensive debate on the definition of terrorism and finally come 
to an agreement that no single definition commands the full approval of the international 
community. However, the definition must be “consistent with international comparators 
and treaties, and [should be] useful and broadly fit for purpose, subject to some 
alteration.”176 The U.K.’s response to terrorism can therefore be viewed from the manner 
in which they have defined terrorism, which is broad and forms the basis of all legal 
actions against terrorism suspects. It accords flexibility, especially in the proscription of 
terrorist organizations, because the acts of terrorism must be viewed from political, 
religious, or social goals.  The legislation has evolved over time, owing to interaction 
between the U.K., EU, and ECHR. The cases analyzed also indicate that a state can be 
held liable by a competent court for violating human-rights principles, regardless of the 
situation. States cannot therefore derogate their obligation of upholding these principles 
for security or emergency reasons. 
The evolution and progress of legislating terrorism in the U.K is relevant to the 
Republic of Kenya because of historical linkages and common-law practice. Kenya 
moved into Somalia last year to fight an Al Qaeda surrogate, Al Shabaab, and in October 
2012 enacted its first counterterrorism law (Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012). There is 
                                                 
175  Oehmichen, Terrorism and anti-terror legislation, 305. 
176 The definition of terrorism, A report by Lord Carlile report, 47. 
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similarity between the two countries’ terrorism legislation. The 2003 Suppression of 
Terrorism bill was almost verbatim to the U.K Terrorism Act 2000, while the 2012 
Prevention of Terrorism Act has deviated a bit with several clauses having been 
domesticated. Controversial clauses that were challenged in U.K domestic and EU courts 
have also found their way into the Kenyan act and range from proscription, right of 
silence, detention, and wider powers of arrest to internment and interrogation. The 
Republic of Kenya should borrow a leaf and adjust the clauses beforehand; otherwise 
similar strategies will be used to quash terrorist cases in future.  
In regard to human-rights violations, unlike the U.K., where the EU has a role in 
checks and balances, in Kenya the violations are handled domestically only. It is 
therefore upon the government of Kenya to legislate or amend clauses that have been 
previously challenged and found wanting in the U.K. before getting embroiled in similar 
court battles. The state is a member of the East African Community (EAC), which has 
several counterterrorism initiatives, but no human-rights court similar to the ECHR. 
Regional bodies have been known to promote the acceptance of competent international 
human-rights organizations in addition to encouraging fellow member states to adhere 
and put into practice a human-rights approach to counterterrorism.177 It is upon the 
Republic of Kenya to initiate a regional approach similar to the European Union’s in 
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IV. TERRORISM LEGISLATION IN KENYA 
Counterterrorism legislation in Kenya has its roots in the last years of British 
colonial rule, which flavored the focus and practice of counterterrorism law for some 
decades even after independence. This ambivalent legacy, as well as Kenya's post-
independence efforts to deepen and broaden the rule of law, including genuine civil-
liberties protections, left Kenya with a legal framework that was acutely ill-prepared for 
the kinds of international terrorist threats that came about with the end of the Cold War 
and the rise of Islamist extremism.  This chapter traces the development of Kenya's main 
counterterrorism acts, the Suppression of Terrorism Bill of 2003 and the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2012, two rather different approaches to the demands of contemporary 
counterterrorism and Kenyan democracy. 
A. BACKGROUND 
In October 1952, the British government, then administering Kenya as a colony, 
declared a state of emergency in the Colony of Kenya to contain the increasing—and 
increasingly violent—activities of Mau Mau fighters.  Britain deemed as “terrorists”  
the Mau Mau fighters who had killed Chief Waruhiu on 7 October 1952, as well as 
2,000 African civilians and 32 white settlers.  In a debate at the House of Lords, the Lord 
Earl of Munster stated: “Mau Mau terrorism is carefully planned, centrally directed and 
its object is to destroy all authority other than Mau Mau.”178 
In rationalizing the imposition of the state of emergency, the Earl of Munster 
continued: 
Action against these leaders was imperative. The ordinary process 
of the law is necessarily slow. In present conditions in Kenya, it 
would have allowed time and opportunity for those behind the 
outrages to organize widespread disturbances in what number of 
innocent people might have been killed.  The declaration of the 
emergency has enabled the Kenya Government to detain the 
ringleader and their lieutenants about 130 together.179 
                                                 
178 House of Lords Hansard HL De6 (21 October 1952) vol 178 cc 789–91 3.23 pm, accessed January 
20, 2012, http://hansard.millbankssystems.com/lords/1952/oct/21/mau-mau-terrorism-in-kenya.  
179 Ibid. 
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Thus, the Kenyan Legislative Council was permitted to pass the Emergency 
Regulations of 1952. The regulations made possession of ammunition and firearms a 
capital offence. Moreover, the regulations also shifted the burden of proof of lawful 
authority or justification for possessing firearms or ammunitions to the accused person, 
contrary to settled criminal practice, where the burden of proof rests with the prosecution. 
The regulation declared Mau Mau a terrorist organization and criminalized membership 
thereof. These regulations created a specialized court, the Court of Emergency Assize, to 
hear and expedite cases against Mau Mau suspects. The court conducted 1211 trials 
between 1953 and 1958, in which 2609 suspects were tried on capital offences linked to 
the Mau Mau group. Among these cases 1574 were sentenced to hang.180 For example, in 
Regina vs Dedan Kimathi Wachiuru,181 a defendant charged under the Emergency 
Regulations for being a member of the Mau Mau and possessing a firearm and 
ammunition (but no direct acts of terrorism or “conventional” criminal acts) was tried in 
the court of emergency assize, presided over by Chief Justice K.K. O’Connor. He was 
convicted and sentenced to death.  
In light of these cases and considering that the Mau Mau revolution was an anti-
colonial revolt against the British who had stripped the natives of their land, the measures 
put in place were heavy-handed and violent, to say the least. The legislation completely 
abrogated the basic civil-liberty protections that form the heart of any criminal code in a 
democratic state. Indeed, the British considered national security to be more important 
than colonial civil liberties and thus unleashed both the military and the special courts, 
outside the normal channels of justice and civic responsibility, to deal with the so-called 
domestic terrorists. These measures set the tone for future government actions even after 
independence.  
Since the Mau Mau revolution, Kenya has changed, as has the nature of terrorism.  
For one thing, Kenya has been a target of both domestic and international terrorism. 
                                                 
180 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire,( W W 
Norton and Company, New York, 2005), 151–170. 




Today, it must balance its counterterrorism measures with its obligations to protect the 
fundamental civil liberties of its citizens. That is, terrorism legislation is meant to address 
the crime of terror and mitigate the risks posed. However, these are but the initial pieces 
of the puzzle; the evidence arising from terrorism is usually in the form of plotting the 
mission and thus difficult to detect and prevent. Legislation should therefore encompass 
measures that are both prophylactic and preemptive in nature because ordinary criminal 
justice system is not. These measures should be able to define the crime of terrorism, 
proscribe terror organizations, tackle terrorist finances and property, and stipulate law-
enforcement powers.  
What’s more, Kenya is bound by its obligations to and within the international 
community.  UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 also requires states to 
criminalize offences related to the planning and preparation of terrorist acts and including 
the perpetrators themselves. The instruments obligate states to domestically criminalize 
the offenses, deal with perpetrators of terror under the approved law, and collaborate with 
other states in prosecuting or extradition.182 The Republic of Kenya has so far acceded to 
all thirteen UN conventions under Resolution 1373 and, thus, must conform its domestic 
law accordingly.183 The key objects of the legislation are to:  
 Provide an appropriate legal framework for the prevention, investigation and 
punishment of terrorism and terrorist financing and hence promote law and order 
and national security.   
 Domesticate in part the various counterterrorism conventions to which Kenya is a 
signatory—the UNSC Resolutions and FATF recommendations and thereby 
enhance Kenya’s satisfaction of its international obligations.     
                                                 
182 Ibid., 11. 
183 UN Conventions under Resolution 1373; 1. The convention on offences and certain other acts 
committed on board Aircraft (1963); 2. Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft 
(1970); 3. Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of civil aviation (1971);4. 
Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons including 
Diplomatic Agents (1973);5. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979); 6. 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980); 7. Protocol for the suppression of 
unlawful Acts of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, supplementary to the convention 
for the suppression of unlawful Acts against the safety of civil aviation (1988);8. Protocol for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the continental shell 
(1988);9. Convention on the marking of plastic Explosives for the purpose of detection (1991);10. 
Intentional convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings; 11. International convention for the 
suppression of the financing of terrorism (1999); 12. International Convention for the suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism (2005). 
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In this framework of requirements for security and liberty, Kenya had undertaken 
two notable efforts in the name of counterterrorism legislation. 
B. THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM BILL 2003 
In the beginning of the new millennium, the Republic of Kenya had just witnessed 
one of the most devastating terror attacks in the country. The 1998 U.S. embassy 
bombing was followed by the 2003 Kikambala bombing in Mombasa; these two 
incidences marked the dawn of international terrorism in Kenya. In a bid to criminalize 
this acts of terror, the then– minister of justice and constitutional affairs tabled the 
Suppression of Terrorism Bill of 2003184  (Supplement No. 38 of the Kenya Gazette) in 
Parliament. The bill immediately stirred up controversy, as had the acts that prompted it. 
The government’s reaction was heavy handed, in part because that was the mood of the 
day and in part because the 1952 act established the precedent that an iron fist meant the 
authorities were dealing with the situation. Ultimately, its flaws undid the bill—though 
not so fatally as to preclude a successor law nearly a decade later.  
These analyses will focus on several problem areas that elicited more controversy 
than others from human-rights organizations such as Amnesty International, the Kenya 
Law Society, lawyers in their individual capacities, the clergy, and the general public.   
 The definition of terrorism—The entire bill/act is based on the definition of 
terrorism. An imprecise definition distorts the whole legislation and renders major 
clauses as being controversial.  
 Terrorism offences—First, what is and what is not an offence under the bill/act is 
highly dependent on the definition. Second, powerful foreign states can easily 
influence smaller states based on their interests if the offences are not clear. Third, 
this is an area that most civil liberties are bound to be violated because domestic 
law enforcement agencies have powers bestowed upon them to deal with the 
crime of terrorism and therefore decide what falls under this category of crime. 
 Declared terrorist organizations—Declaring an organization or an individual as a 
terrorist entity is also dependent on a precise definition of terrorism. It is an area 
that is prone to abuse, especially if there is no control mechanisms stipulated 
before hand. These powers of declaring an organization are usually executive 
powers. 
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Supplement Nairobi, (30 April 2003 at 443), Clause 3. 
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 Law-enforcement powers—Counterterrorism is conducted by law-enforcement 
officers. In Kenya, Police officers have been known to be highly corrupt. If these 
powers have no checks and balances then terrorism will still flourish in the eyes 
of corrupt officers. These powers if unchecked also violate civil liberties. 
 Rights and freedoms—In the case of Kenya, certain human rights are enshrined in 
the constitution and cannot be taken away. Those with caveats have safeguards 
within the system and must therefore be handled with care. 
1. Definition of Terrorism 
The definition of terrorism is important because only an offense that meets this 
definition falls under the strictures of the law. In a sense, the definition establishes the 
threshold of “terrorism” from a legal perspective. For various reasons, however, even this 
vital first step is a matter of controversy, both within Kenya and internationally. For 
example, the following treaties guide the formulation of the definition of terrorism: 
 The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings- 
 1998 United Nations resolution 1189 
 1999 United Nations resolution 1267 
 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
 2001 United Nations resolution 1368 
 2001 United Nations resolution 1373 
 2004 United Nations Resolution 1566 
 2005 United Nations Resolution 1624 
 2006 United Nations Counter-terrorism strategy 
None of these documents provides a clear definition of terrorism, and no globally 







Martin Scheinin gave a model definition185 and opines that any definition that goes 
beyond the model prescribed “would be problematic from a human-rights 
perspective.”186 Therefore, the definition of terrorism must at least be generally in line 
with specified international norms, such that they are. 
In the 2003 Suppression of Terrorism Bill, terrorism is defined as: 
the use or threat of action where –  
 3(1)(a) The action used or threatened – 
 (i) involves serious violence against a person; 
 (ii) involves serious damage to property; 
 (iii) endangers the life of any person other than the person  
 committing the action; 
 (iv) Creates a serious risk to the health or safety or the 
public  or a section of the public; or 
 (v) Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously 
disrupt an electronic system; 
 (b) The use or threat is designed to influence the 
government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; 
and 
 (c) The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a 
 political religious or ideological cause; provided that the 
use or  threat of action which involves the use of – 
 (i) Firearms or explosives; 
                                                 
185 Human Rights Council, Sixteenth session, A/HRC/16/51, 22 December 2010. Agenda item 
3Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights 
including the right to development.  Terrorism means an action or attempted action where: 
1. The action: 
 (a) Constituted the intentional taking of hostages; or 
 (b) Is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to one or more members of the general 
population or segments of it; or 
 (c) Involved lethal or serious physical violence against one or more members of the general 
population or segments of it; and 
 2. The action is done or attempted with the intention of: 
 (a) Provoking a state of terror in the general public or a segment of it; or 
 (b) Compelling a Government or international organization to do or abstain from doing something;
 and 
 (3) The action corresponds to: 
 (a) The definition of a serious offence in national law, enacted for the  purpose of complying 
with international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism or with resolutions of the Security 
Council relating to terrorism; or 
 (b) All elements of a serious crime defined by national law. 
186 Human Rights Council, Sixteenth session, A/HRC/16/51, (22 December 2010), para 28, 14. 
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 (ii) Chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons;  
  or 
 (iii) weapons of mass destruction in any form shall be  
  deemed to constitute terrorism whether or not 
paragraph (b)  is satisfied. 
 (2) In this section – 
 (a) “Action” includes action outside Kenya; 
 (b) A reference to any person or to property is a reference  
  to any  person, or to property, wherever situated; 
 (c) A reference to the public includes a reference to the  
  public of a country other than Kenya; and  
 (d) ‘the government’ means the government of Kenya or of  
  a country other than Kenya.187 
 
This definition was critiqued for being vague, overbroad, and unclear, particularly 
in the articulation of the elements of the crime of terrorism. . The East African Law 
Society described the definition as “so absurdly wide as to mean anything and thus 
nothing.”188 The organization argued that incidents such as bar brawls, domestic quarrels 
and college strikes could easily be misconstrued as terrorist acts if the definition were 
adopted in its current form.189  
Further, clauses 3(a) (b) and (c) are conjunctive, and therefore must be satisfied 
subject to 3(c) (i) (ii) and (iii). These clauses designate use of weapons of mass 
destruction, chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, explosives and firearms as 
terrorism regardless of 3(b). In clauses 3 (b), where it states; “The use or threat is 
designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the 
public” the word “influence” in the statement was argued to be so broad as to cover, for 
example, teachers and nurses striking for higher salaries. Another definition that had a 
loophole was the reference to “religious or ideological causes” found in clause 3 (1) (c). 
Clive Walker argues that “’religious’ seems superfluous and might cause problems by 
blurring into personal disputes, such as family or clan disputes about an arranged 
marriage or dowry.”190 “Ideological causes,” on the other hand, could include political 
                                                 
187 Suppression of terrorism bill, 2003, Clause 3. 
188 EALS Statement on Kenya’s draft Anti-terrorism Law, (Legal brief May 29, 2003). 
189 Ibid. 
190 Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 10. 
 62
activists such as anti-abortion organizations targeting government policies. According to 
Amnesty International, if the definition is vague “how would a court of law adjudicate a 
case of incitement to commit and act of terrorism?”191  An ill-crafted definition opens 
doors for abuse and can be utilized by oppressive regimes for political gains. It also gives 
sweeping discretionary powers to police and customs officials to establish whether an act 
is crime of terror under the proposed bills.   
2. Terrorism offences 
Clause 8 covers incitement of offences outside the country and states as follows;  
(1) A person shall be guilty of an offence if— 
(a) he incites another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly 
or partly outside Kenya; and 
(b) the act would, if committed in Kenya, constitute an offence 
under this or any  other Act. 
(2) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable 
to any penalty to which he would be liable on conviction of the 
relevant offence referred to in subsection (1)(b) 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is immaterial whether or 
not the person incited is in Kenya at the time of the incitement.192 
The debate in regard to this clause was that arrests could easily be influenced by the 
foreign policy of the country. Subsection (a) also suggests that the offence may be 
committed by words alone regardless of place of execution. Furthermore, as previously 
mentioned, the definition of terrorism was found to be vague, therefore the clause opens 
doors for abuse by prosecutors who could interpret  the word “incite” in whichever way 
they like. 
3. Declared Terrorist Organizations 
 Part III clause 9 of the 2003 bill states that: 
(1) For the purposes of this Act, an organization is a declared 
terrorist organization if— 
 (a) it has, by a notice in force under this subsection, been 
declared to be concerned in terrorism; or 
                                                 
191 Amnesty International, “Kenya: Draft ant-terrorism legislation may undermine Kenyan 
Constitution and International Law,” AFR 32/004/2004/ (9 September 2004). 
192  Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003, Clause 8. 
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 (b) it operates under the same name as an organization 
referred to in paragraph (a). 
(2) Subsection (1) (b) has effect subject to the terms of any notice 
published under this section. 
(3) The Minister may bu notice published in the Gazette— 
(a) declare that a specified organization is concerned in terrorism; 
or 
(b) revoke any notice previously published under this section. 
(4) The Minister may exercise his power under subsection (3) (a) 
in respect of an organization only if he believes that it is concern in 
terrorism. 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4), an organization is concern 
in terrorism if it— 
(a)commits or participates in acts of terrorism; 
(b) prepares for terrorism; 
(c) promotes or encourages terrorism; or 
(d) is otherwise concern in terrorism.193 
Declaring an organization to be a terrorist organization is an executive power bestowed 
on the minister and thus gives him wide discretion without formal or written review 
process for checks and balances. Declared organizations cannot challenge the minister’s 
decision anywhere, nor can it be reviewed except by the minister himself. The clause is 
open to abuse especially by politicians. If the definition of terrorism is vague, then how 
can the criteria in Clause 9 (5)194 be right? It therefore follows that these criteria will 
always be imprecise and subject to abuse by politicians.  
Clause 10 states: “(1) A person who belongs or professes to belong to an 
organization that is a declared terrorist organization shall be guilty of an offence and shall 
be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or to a fine, or 
both” 195 This clause makes it an offense to have joined an organization without prior 
knowledge that it was concern with terrorism. Under 10(2) (a) and (b): 
(2) it is a defense for a person charged with an offence under 
subsection (1) to satisfy the court— 
(a) that the organization was not a declared terrorist organization 
on the last (or only) occasion on which he became a member or 
began to profess to be a member; and 
                                                 
193 Ibid Part III Clause 9. 
194  Suppression of Terrorism bill 2003, Clause 9 (5)   
195 Ibid., Clause 10. 
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(b) that he has not taken in the activities of the organization at any 
time while it was a declared terrorist organization.196 
The onus is left to the accused to prove that at the time he joined the organization, 
it had not been declared a terrorist organization. Again, there is no form of redress, and 
the clause infringes on the freedom of association as stipulated in the ICCPR Article 22 
that states: “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”197 
4. Law-Enforcement Powers 
a. Powers of Search and Seizure 
Clause 26 of the 2003 bill states that: 
(1) Where, in a case of urgency, communication with a judge to 
obtain a warrant would cause delay that may be prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public safety or public safety or public order, a 
police officer of or above the rank of inspector may, 
notwithstanding any other Act, with the assistance of such other 
members of the police force as may be necessary— 
 (a) enter and search any premises or places, if he has reason 
to suspect that, within those premises or at that place—(i) an 
offence under this Act is being committed or likely to be 
committed; or (ii) there is evidence of the commission of an 
offence under this Act; 
 (b) search any person or vehicle found on any premises or 
place which he is empowered to enter and search under paragraph 
(a); 
 (c) stop, board and search any vessel, aircraft or vehicle if 
he has reason to suspect that there is in it evidence of the 
commission or likelihood of commission of an offence under this 
Act; 
 (d) seize, remove and detain anything which is, or contains 
or appears to him to be or to contain or to be likely to be or to 
contain, evidence of the commission of an offence under this Act; 
 (e)  arrest and detain any person whom he reasonably 
suspects of having committed or of being about to commit an 
offence under this Act. 198  
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198  Suppression of Terrorism bill, 2003, Clause 26. 
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The clause grants police officers of the rank of inspector or above 
sweeping powers to enter and search places, premises, people, vessels, and aircrafts 
without a warrant from a judge so long as it is a case of urgency.,  
Part IX clause 40, this states that: 
(1) A power conferred by or under this Act on a member of the police 
force, customs officer or other officer is additional to powers which he has 
at common law or by virtue of any enactment, and shall not be taken to 
restrict or affect those powers. 
(2) A member of the police force, customs officer or other person may if 
necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power 
conferred on him by virtue of this Act. 
(3) A member of the police force, customs officer or other officer who 
uses such force as may be necessary for any purpose, in accordance with 
this Act, shall not be liable in any criminal or civil proceedings for having, 
by the use of force, cause injury or death to any person or damage to or 
loss of any property.199 
 
The act similarly grants sweeping powers to police officers, customs officers or 
other officer. A question arises, then: Who is the other officer? The bill does not specify, 
and thus stands open to abuse by any person who claims to be appointed by the 
government. Rogue government agents, and corrupt politicians can also easily collude to 
abuse the aforementioned powers. Furthermore, the clause also seeks to protect the 
government officers from prosecution regardless of circumstances thereafter. 
Clause 21, which deals with seizure and detention of terrorist’s cash, states 
that: 
(1) An authorized officer who has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that any cash is being imported into or exported from Kenya, or is 
being brought to any place in Kenya for the purpose of being 
exported from Kenya, is terrorist property, may seize the cash 
(2) An authorized officer may seize cash under this section even if 
he reasonably suspects part only of the cash to be terrorist 
property, where it is not reasonably practicable to seize that part 
only of the cash. 
(3) An authorized officer may exercise his powers under 
subsection (1), whether or not any proceedings have been brought 
for an offence in connection with the cash concerned. 
                                                 
199 Ibid., Part IX Clause 40. 
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(4) The authorized officer shall, as soon as is practicable, make an 
ex parte application to the High Court for a detention order with 
respect to the cash seized under subsection (1).200 
 
The clause is deficient in that it grants powers to seize cash and seek an ex 
parte application afterwards when it’s “reasonably practicable.” The problem here is that 
it is left to the police officer to decide what is reasonable and what is practicable when 
seizing cash and making an application to the High Court. It’s all in the mind of the 
police officer; no written guidance or measures to counter check his decisions. The clause 
is also in violation of the African Charter on Human and People Rights (ACHPR) article 
14, which states: “The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.”201 Commencing with a vague 
definition of terrorism and powers bestowed on a police officer without written guidance; 
this clause was bound to be controversial. 
b.  Incommunicado Detention 
Detention for offenses related to terrorism in the 2003 bill is covered in 
Clause 30. The clause states as follows: 
(1) Where any person is arrested under reasonable suspicion of 
having committed any offence under any of the provisions of Parts 
II, III and IV of this Act, a police officer of or above the rank of 
inspector may, subject to this section, direct that the person 
arrested be detained in police custody for a period not exceeding 
thirty-six hours from his arrest, without having access to any 
person other than a police officer of or above the rank of inspector 
or a government medical officer and, in any such case, that person 
shall be detained accordingly. 
(2) No direction under subsection (1) shall be given unless the 
police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the exercise of 
the right to consult a legal adviser— 
 (a) will lead to interference with or harm to evidence 
connected with an offence under any of the provisions of Parts II, 
                                                 
200Suppression of Terrorism bill, 2003, Clause 21. 
201 ACHPR article 14 states: The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be encroached 
upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in accordance with the 
provisions of appropriate laws. 
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III and IV of this Act, or to interference with, or physical injury to, 
other persons; 
 (b) will lead to the alerting of other persons suspected of 
having committed such, an offence but not yet arrested for it; or 
 (c) will hinder the tracking of, search for or seizure of 
terrorist property. 
(3) As soon as a direction is issued under subsection (1), the person 
detained shall be informed that he may, if he so wishes, be 
examined by a government medical officer.202 
 
The bill again grants police officers enormous powers without formal 
checks and balances. First, the 36 hour detention period is inconsistent with the 
constitution of Kenya that in article 49 clearly states that the period shall not exceed 24 
hours. Secondly, the bill does not say what happens after the expiry of 36 hours. The 
police are left to decide whether the detainee should access a medical doctor or a lawyer. 
If, however, there is reason to believe that access to a lawyer will interfere with evidence 
under Part II, III and IV203 of the bill, then, the police are allowed to deny such 
privileges. These powers are definitely subject to abuse as the decisions are in the minds 
of the police. In all other connections, presumably, the terrorism detainee could be held 
incommunicado.  In this regard the bill also violates ICCPR provisions—in particular 
Article 14 (3) (b)204 on equality, and Article 9205 regarding the liberty and security of an 
individual.  The bill states why a suspect is detained but does not stipulate what happens 
afterward. Human rights organizations cited these anomalies as gateways to torture and 
forced confessions. Specifically, they point at the violation of resolution 1997/38, which 
states that “prolonged incommunicado detention may facilitate the perpetration of torture 
                                                 
202  Suppression of Terrorism bill, 2003, Clause 30. 
203 Part II deals with terrorist offenses, Part III deals with declared terrorist organizations and Part IV 
with terrorist property. 
204 ICCPR article 14 (3) (b) state: In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:(b) To have adequate time and 
facilities for the preparation of his defense and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing. 
205 Ibid., article 9(1) state :( 1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds 
and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
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and in itself constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”206  This aspect 
also entails the violation of ICCPR Article 7207 or 10208.  
c. Immunity of Law Enforcement 
The 2003 bill states in Clause 40 (3): “A member of the police force, 
customs or other officer who uses such force as may be necessary for any purpose, in 
accordance with this Act shall not be liable in any criminal or civil proceedings for 
having, by the use of force, caused injury or death to any person or damage to or loss of 
any property.”209 The clause basically exonerates the officers from all blame and shields 
them from any kind of criminal or civil proceedings regardless of the circumstances of 
the offenses. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International had the view that 
these officers were thus given a blank check to torture, maim, kill, and even destroy 
property in the name of counterterrorism.  
By ratifying the ACHPR, the Republic of Kenya agreed to adhere to all its 
provisions.  In this case, articles 1 and 2.210 It therefore follows that the Republic of 
Kenya is out of compliance to the provisions of ACHPR and may be held responsible by 
the African Union.  Furthermore, the clause negates the right to redress by any aggrieved 
party thus violating ICCPR provisions found in article 2 (3).211  
                                                 
206 U N Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/38 Para 20. 
207 ICCPR article 7 states that; No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or 
scientific experimentation. 
208 Ibid., article 10 that states: All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 
209  Suppression of Terrorism bill, 2003, Clause 40 (3). 
210 ACHPR Part I Chapter 1, states in Article 1. The Member States of the Organization of African 
Unity parties to the present Charter Shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this 
Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them. Article 2 Every 
individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the 
present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. 
211 ICCPR Article 2 (3) states that: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:  
 (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting  in an 
official capacity;  
 69
d. Extradition 
Clause 37 states that:  
(1)Where Kenya is a party to a counter-terrorist convention and 
there is in force an extradition agreement between the Government 
of Kenya and another state which is party to that convention, the 
extradition agreement shall be deemed, for the purposes of the 
Extradition Acts, to include provision for extradition in respect of 
offences falling within the scope of that convention. 
(2) Where Kenya is a party to a counter-terrorist convention and 
there is no extradition agreement in force between the Government 
of Kenya and another state which is party to that convention, the 
Minister responsible for foreign affairs may, by order published in 
the Gazette, treat the counter-terrorism convention, for the 
purposes of the Extradition Acts, as an extradition agreement 
between the Government of Kenya and that state, providing for 
extradition in respect of offences falling within the scope of that 
convention. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything in the Extradition Acts, an offence 
which caused or was intended or likely to cause death or serious 
bodily harm to any person, or serious damage to any property, 
shall for the purposes of extradition in accordance with this section 
be deemed not to be an offence of a political character.212 
This clause violates Article 3 of the UN convention against torture and other cruel 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; it also violates the principles of non-
refoulement. The clause seeks to extradite terror suspects to countries that are party to 
counterterrorism conventions and to those that are not, this happens without regard to the 
other state’s human rights record or rights of fair trial—or the suspect’s will. It does not 
stipulate any guarantees, legal or otherwise, of the individual’s personal safety once 
extradited.  
5. Freedom of information and Expression 
Clause 29 of the 2003 bill states that: 
                                                                                                                                                 
 (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided 
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;  
 (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.  
212  Suppression of Terrorism bill,2003 Clause 37. 
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(1) A person who,  knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect 
that a member of the police force is conducting or proposes to 
conduct a terrorist investigation— 
(a) discloses to another person anything which is likely to 
prejudice the investigation; or  
(b) interferes with material which is likely to be relevant to the 
investigation, 
Shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or to a fine, or 
both. 
(2) A person who, knowing or having reasonable cause to suspect 
that a disclosure has been or will be made under section 18—
[which deals with cooperation with police] 
(a) discloses to another person anything which is likely to 
prejudice an investigation resulting from the disclosure under that 
section; or 
(b) interferes with material which is likely to be relevant to an 
investigation resulting from the disclosure under that section.213 
 
Clause 29 is in breech of ICCPR Article 19214 and ACHPR Article 9.215 The clause deals 
with disclosure of information related to or connected to terror investigations. Amnesty 
international argues that the clause would be utilized by the police to intimidate 
journalists and lawyers from investigating and reporting certain activities within their line 
of work. The clause essentially criminalizes disclosure of such information and provides 
for punishment not exceeding ten years in jail. 
Clause 12 was also heavily criticized by and particularly infuriated Kenyan 
Muslims, who complained of being unfairly targeted by the legislation. Specifically, 
clause 12, paragraph two states: “a person who, in a public place wears an item of 
clothing, or wears or carries or displays an article in such a way or in such circumstances 
as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is a member or supporter of a declared terrorist 
                                                 
213 Ibid Clause 29. 
214 Ibid Article 19 states:  1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.  
215 ACHPR Article 9 states:  1. Every individual shall have the right to receive information.2. Every 
individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinions within the law. 
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organization is guilty of an offense.”216  In Kenya, dressing symbolizes or expresses an 
individual’s pride in belonging to a certain ethnic group, religion, or culture. This section 
essentially gives the police powers to profile certain communities and even arrest 
Muslims for wearing religious garb. Having gone through two oppressive regimes of 
former presidents Kenyatta and Moi from 1962 to 2002, Kenyans feel that such 
legislation is a step backward. The clause provides for punishment not exceeding six 
months in jail or a fine or both.  
The 2003 bill lapsed as a result of pressure from key stakeholders, thus conclusive 
consultations and reviews were never done. The bill was viewed as a continuation of the 
past oppressive regimes that sought to deal with problems with an iron fist regardless of 
the people’s civil liberty concerns. In the end, the critics of the bill carried the day as their 
concerns denied the government an opportunity to enact what was considered an 
oppressive and retrogressive legislation. The government, however, still held its ground 
and argued that in order to curb terrorism certain civil liberties must be compromised for 
the sake of national security.  
 After this debacle, the Republic of Kenya went through post-election violence in 
1998 that prompted the enactment of a new constitution. The constitution established 
institutions (the administration and judicial oversight body and the independent police 
oversight authority) that are expected to protect civil liberties. The country also witnessed 
an increase in terror activities in the year 2011 and 2012, more so because of the 
lawlessness in Somali that Al Qaeda took advantage of. This situation led the government 
to introducing a fresh legislation for debate in the Kenyan Parliament. 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACT 2012 
After nearly a decade of disagreement, the 2003 bill was mooted and a new bill 
was enacted as the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012. This act was drafted with a careful 
eye toward the concerns raised by various stakeholders. As a consequence, the new act 
has ample safeguards for the rights of persons and entities affected in the process of 
                                                 
216 Kenya Gazette Supplement, The Suppression of Terrorism Bill, 2003, 38 Kenya Gazette 
Supplement Nairobi, 30 April 2003 at 443, Clause 12(2). 
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combating terrorism—at least in terms of those areas of contention raised by the 2003 
bill.  That is, without question, the 2012 act marks an improvement in the civil-liberties 
sensibilities of Kenya’s counterterrorism law.  It is by no means a perfect document, but 
the progress is both welcome and vitally important to Kenya’s citizens, who value both 
their national security and their human rights.   
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 was introduced in parliament by the acting 
minister of state for provincial administration and internal security, Honorable Mohamed 
Yusuf Haji via a Kenya Gazette supplement No. 77 on the 27 of July 2012, following 
sporadic attacks by the Al Shabaab terror group. The act was drafted with regard to the 
concerns raised by various stakeholders regarding the 2003 bill. It addressed the 
following concerns: 
 
 Broad definition of terrorism that also extended to political protests, mass action, 
industrial action and other forms of violence 
 Declaration of an organization as a terrorist organization was without due process 
and open to abuse 
 Absence of redress mechanism for innocent persons and entities affected in the 
process of combating terrorism 
 Criminalization of innocent acts even where a person had no intention or motive 
of committing the impugned act 
 Reversal of the burden of proof in that the burden of proving innocence was 
placed on the suspect as opposed to the prosecution contrary to the constitutional 
principle on presumption of innocence and other principles of criminal liability  
 Wide and intrusive investigative powers of the law enforcement agencies     
 Religious profiling in that the bill appeared to target a section of the society by 
reference to the manner of dressing  
 Seizure and confiscation of property suspected to be used in terrorist acts was 
without due process and open to abuse  
 Where incommunicado detention of suspects beyond the constitutionally 
recognized timeframe within which one must be brought before a court of law 
  The provisions on mutual legal assistance, extra-territorial application and 
Extradition of suspects gave the impression of that the bill was foreign driven   
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The act was passed and enacted into law in October 2012. It contains six parts217 
(52 sections and two schedules. Though the whole act is important for analysis, this thesis 
will focus on the most contentious issues. 
1. Definition of Terrorism 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012, unlike the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 
2003 seeks to define “acts of terrorism” 218 as opposed to defining “terrorism,” which is 
subject to many definitions. The law also applies to acts with far fewer theoretical or 
practical problems, particularly from a civil-rights perspective, than, say, to ideas, status, 
or inclinations.  The definition has significant changes from its predecessor and the main 
areas that were affected are as follows: 
                                                 
217 Parts of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012are as follows: Part 1 – Defines words and 
expressions; part 2 – Specified entities; part 3 – Terrorism offences; part 4 – Investigating offences; part 5 – 
Trial of offences; part 6 – Miscellaneous. 
218  Prevention of terrorism act 2012 Clause  2 (1)(a) states that a ,” terrorist act" means an act or 
threat of action— 
 (a) which— 
(i) involves the use of violence against a person; 
(ii) endangers the life of a person, other than the person committing the action; 
(iii) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public; 
(iv) results in serious damage to property;  
(v) involves the use of firearms or explosives; 
   (vi) involves the release of any dangerous, hazardous, toxic or radioactive substance or 
 microbial or other biological agent or toxin into the environment; 
(vii) interferes with an electronic system resulting in the disruption of the provision of  communication, 
financial, transport or other essential services; 
(viii) interferes or disrupts the provision of essential or emergency services; 
(ix) prejudices national security or public safety; and 
 (b) which is carried out with the aim of— 
 (i) intimidating or causing fear amongst members of the public or a section of the public; or 
  (ii) intimidating or compelling the Government or an international organization to do or refrain 
from doing any act; or 
  (iii) Destabilizing the religious, political, constitutional, economic or social institutions of a 
country, or an international organization. “provided that an act which disrupts any services and is 
committed in pursuance of a protest, demonstration or stoppage of work shall be deemed not to be a 
terrorist act within the meaning of  this definition so long as the act is not intended to result in any harm 
referred to in paragraph (a) (i)-(iv).”   
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 In the act, paragraph (a), sub-paragraph (vii), is more specific where it states: 
“interferes with electronic systems resulting in the disruption of the provision of 
communication, financial, transport or other essential services.”219 In its 
predecessor it only mentions the disruption of an electronic system, which could 
be a small generator in the village used by a local Chief to address congregations. 
 Paragraph (a) sub-paragraph (viii) has a provision on “disruption of essential and 
emergency services”220 that is not found in the 2003 definition. 
 Paragraph (b) sub-paragraph (iii); replaced one of the most controversial clauses 
of the bill that touched on religious, ideological, and ethnic causes. The act leaves 
out religious, ideological, and ethnic motives that are usually linked to terrorism. 
It simply means that regardless of the motive (religious, ethnic, ideological or 
political) as long as the perpetrators intend to cause harm as described in (a)(i)-
(iv) and with the aim as tabulated in (b)(i)-(iii), the act will still be regarded as 
terrorism. 
 After subsection (b), the 2012 act qualifies what should and should not be 
classified as a terror act—and expressly excludes acts committed in pursuance of 
a protest, demonstration, or industrial action from being regarded as terrorist acts. 
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012 is clear and precise as compared to its 
predecessor. Most of its sections beginning with definition of terms to disclosure of 
information relating to terrorist acts are important and relevant to the detection and 
prevention of terrorism. Further, the stiff penalties in all the offences reflect the gravity of 
those offences. Detection and prevention which are sought to be achieved by the act, are 
very important in countering terrorism. Throughout the act, the provisions seek to instill 
measures to identify commencement of any terrorist activity and prosecution of 
individuals involved in terrorism at such stages in a bid to avert full exposure to the crime 
of terrorism.   
Even though the act appears to be focused on the Kenyan context, provisions 
prosecution of individuals having committed terrorism against Kenyan citizens in other 
states221 or planned outside the country and committed inside Kenya222 makes the fight 
against terrorism global. This aspect serves to secure Kenyan citizens and property within 
the country, and outside, including other nationals in or outside Kenya. The act conforms 
                                                 
219 Ibid.,  Clause 2 (a) (vii). 
220 Ibid., Clause 2 (a) (viii). 
221 Ibid., section 21.  
222 Ibid., Section 38 and 21. 
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to constitutional requirements as tabulated in the Bill of Rights. Other safeguards have 
also been catered for through the judicial oversight body and the independent police 
oversight authority. 
2. Terrorism Offences and Sentencing 
A number of offences relating to financing, recruitment, training, and preparations 
to commit a terrorist attack are laid down in Part 3. The act provides life imprisonment223  
for persons who carry out terrorist acts that result in the death of another person—as 
opposed to death sentence as provided for in the penal code. The reasons for this 
discrepancy that terrorist are often ready to die and imposing a death sentence would 
unnecessarily grant them the status of a martyr. In addition, there may be challenges in 
extraditing suspects to stand trial in Kenya in the event the subjects are liable to death 
sentence, because most countries have a bar to extraditing suspects to countries that mete 
out death penalties. A similar penalty224 awaits leaders of terrorist groups who command 
their followers to cause pain, suffering, or death. Heavy jail terms await those who take 
part in this heinous crime. Anyone aiding the activities of terrorism,225 through financial 
support, collection of intelligence, or through any other action will be jailed for twenty 
years. No fines have been created as an alternative to imprisonment. For all offences 
under the Act, the mode of punishment is by imprisonment. The stiff sentences are action 
focused and commensurate with the debilitating consequences of terrorism, and are 
intended to serve as deterrence.  
                                                 
223 Ibid., section 4 states that:(1) A person who carries out a terrorist act commits an offence and is 
liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding thirty years.  
(2) Where a person carries out a terrorist act which results in the death of another person, such person is 
liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for life. 
224 Ibid section 12 states that: A person who, being a member of a terrorist group, directs or instructs 
any person to commit a terrorist act commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for 
life 
225Ibid section 9 states that:  
(1) A person who knowingly supports or solicits support for the commission of a terrorist act by any 
person or terrorist group commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding twenty years. 
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All the offences under the act require a person to have positive knowledge or a 
guilty mind on the support or facilitation of offences under the bill as opposed to inferred 
knowledge. The rights to presumption of innocence and fair trial are intact. Signally, in 
all the offences, the burden of proof is on the prosecution and not the suspect. 
3. Declared Terrorist Organizations (Specified Entity)  
In the 2012 act “declared terrorist organizations” was changed to specified 
entities. An entity according to the act is defined as: “a person, group of persons, trust, 
partnership, fund or an unincorporated association or organization.”226 While a "specified 
entity" means an entity in respect of which an order under Section 3 has been made.” 
According to the act, Part II, Section 3,227 the inspector general of police can recommend 
to the cabinet secretary228 that an order be issued against certain entity/entities under the 
article. The cabinet secretary on his part if satisfied that there is reasonable grounds may 
go ahead and declare an entity—that is, to add it to the list of terrorist organizations. In 
this case only two statutory thresholds must be overcome in order to declare an 
organization a specified entity—the inspector general’s recommendations based on 
Section 3(1)(a) & (b) and the cabinet secretary’s belief. The act does not give any 
                                                 
226 Ibid., Part I, Preliminary, interpretation. 
227  Ibid., Part II, section 3 states that: 
 (1) Where the Inspector-General has reasonable grounds to believe that—(a) an entity has— 
 (i) committed or prepared to commit;  
 (ii) attempted to commit; or  
 (iii) participated in or facilitated the commission of a terrorist act; or  
 (b) an entity is acting— 
 (i) on behalf of;  
 (ii) at the direction of or  
 (iii) in association with, an entity referred to in paragraph (a), he may recommend to the Cabinet 
Secretary that an order be made under subsection (2) in respect of that entity. 
  (2) Upon receipt of the recommendation under subsection (1), the Cabinet Secretary may, where 
he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to support a recommendation made under subsection (1), 
declare, by order published in the Gazette, the entity in respect of which the recommendation has been 
made to be a specified entity. 
228 Cabinet Secretaries were introduced in the 2010 Constitution and are equivalent to Ministers. 
Kenya will no longer have Ministers but Cabinet Secretaries as from 2012 elections. 
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discretionary factors that must be satisfied in order to proscribe an organization. (Unlike 
Kenya, the U.K. has five discretionary factors229 that the secretary of state follows before 
proscribing an organization.) Specifying an entity usually infringes on such human rights 
as freedom of expression and association as guaranteed by the constitution and the 
ICCPR. 
According to the act, entities can be individuals; group of persons; trust; 
partnership; fund or unincorporated associations or organizations. Therefore, as per the 
definition of a terrorist act, a person intimidating members of the public can be declared a 
specified entity by the cabinet secretary, with the recommendation of the inspector 
general. Once an entity has been specified and gazetted, it loses the protection of the law 
and its activities are curtailed—even if the entity was established on legal ground and its 
activities are within the law. If it engages or attempts to engage in any activity forming 
part of a terrorist act as provided by the 2012 act, it will lose its legality. Consequently, it 
will lose the protection of the law.  
This means that all organizations or groups in the country that have been declared 
illegal by law are automatically specified entities. This declaration is based on their 
activities, which threatened national security, intimidation to general public or sections of 
the general public, use of violence or threat of action involving use of violence against 
people, among other activities. However, as required by Article 47 of the constitution, the 
affected entity has recourse to administrative remedy by applying to the inspector general 
for revocation of the order. An entity dissatisfied or aggrieved by the decision of the 
inspector general can seek redress to the high court for reevaluation. The verdict is not a 
permanent mark against the affected entity because the decision is subject to 
administrative review every twelve months.  
Even though the specified entity is to be accorded this opportunity, danger looms 
for specification of entities engaging in activities causing environmental pollution or 
                                                 
229 Hansard HL vol.613 col. 252 (16 May 2000), Lord Bassam tabulates the discretionary factors as 
follows: the nature and scale of the organization’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the U.K; the 
specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the extent of the organization’s presence in the 
U.K; and the need to support other members of the international community in the global flight against 
terrorism. 
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intimidating the public. This Article will be a cause of legal tussles in a bid to overturn 
the ruling. 
4. Law-enforcement powers 
a. Seizure of Property 
In regard to seizure of property as tabulated in Section 43: 
(1) The Inspector-General may, where he has reasonable grounds 
to suspect that any property has been, or is being used for the 
purpose of committing an offence under this Act, seize that 
property. 
(2) The Inspector-General may exercise powers conferred under 
subsection (1), whether or not any proceedings have been instituted 
for an offence under this Act in relation to such property. 
(3) The Inspector-General shall as soon as is reasonably 
practicable but not later than twenty one days after seizing property 
under subsection (1), make an application, ex-parte and supported 
by an affidavit, to the High Court for an order to detain that 
property. 
(4) The High Court shall not determine an application under 
subsection (3) unless— 
 (a) every person having an interest in the property has been given 
a reasonable opportunity to be heard; and 
(b) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property has 
been, or is being used for the purpose of committing an offence 
under this Act. 
(5) Subject to subsection (6), an order for the detention of property 
made under subsection (4) shall be valid for a period of sixty days 
and may on-application, be extended by the High Court for such 
further period as may be necessary to enable, where applicable, the 
production of the property in Court in proceedings for an offence 
under this Act in respect of that property. 
(6) The High Court may release any property seized under this 
section if— 
 (a) the Court no longer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
property has been or is being used for the commission of an 
offence under this Act; or 
(b) no proceedings are instituted in the High Court for an offence 
under this Act in respect of that property within six months of the 
date of the detention order. 
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(7) No civil or criminal proceedings shall lie against the Inspector-
General for a seizure of property made in good faith under 
subsection (1).230 
  
The power given to the inspector general is only preservatory/temporary and does not 
extend to disposal or permanent deprivation of property. The inspector general is required 
within and not later than 21 days move to court to have the court either confirm or lift the 
seizure. After 21 days, only the high court can determine whether the property should still 
be detained by the inspector general. The court will not issue an order for detention 
unless: 
 Every person who has an interest in property has been given an opportunity to be 
heard. 
 It believes reasonable grounds that the property has been or is being used for 
related offences.  
Deprivation is not permanent, as the property may be released to the owner if there are no 
grounds for continued detention or no forfeiture proceedings are instituted within six 
months. Forfeiture to the state is subject to rigorous due process. 
b. Powers of Police Officers 
Section 31 states that: “a police officer may arrest a person where he has 
reasonable grounds to believe that such person has committed or is committing an 
offence under this Act.”231 The powers of arrest that are vested in police officers under 
this article are subject to judicial oversight. The police are required to base all arrests on 
reasonable grounds, and the suspect is to be either taken to court or released within 24 
hours as provided by the Constitution. Any continued detention has to be sanction by the 
courts of law. An area of concern is that the police are authorized to arrest without a 
warrant so long as they have “reasonable grounds” that an individual is about to 
commit/is committing or has committed an offense. These are very wide powers that can 
also be used to arrest (legally) individuals who might never be charged under this act. 
                                                 
230 Prevention of terrorism Act 2012, section 43. 
231  Ibid., section 31. 
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The officer need not have a particular offence in mind in order to arrest an individual; it’s 
entirely based on his perception and whatever he considers a terrorist act at that moment. 
c. Detention (Remand) and Right to be Released 
In the act, the issue of detention has been rectified in Section 32 which 
states that: 
(1) A person arrested under section 24 (referred to as the suspect) 
shall not be held for more than twenty four hours after his arrest 
unless— 
(a) the suspect is produced before a Court and the Court has 
ordered that the suspect be remanded in custody; or  
b) it is not reasonably practicable, having regard to the distance 
from the place where the suspect is held to the nearest Court, the 
non availability of a judge or magistrate, or force majeure to 
produce the suspect before a Court before the expiry of twenty four 
hours after the arrest of the suspect.232   
The section conforms to the 24-hour detention maximum given in the constitution. Any 
other extension to the stipulated period requires court approval under several stringent 
conditions (detailed in Article 33233) and may not exceed a total of 90 days, inclusive of 
the initial period of arrest. The provision is in line with the Article 49 of the constitution 
on the rights of an arrested person.  
                                                 
232 Ibid., article 32. 
233 Ibid., article 33 states that:  
 (1) A police officer who detains a suspect may, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
detention of the suspect beyond the period specified in section 32 is necessary, —  
 (a) produce the suspect before a Court; and  
 (b) apply in writing to the Court for an extension of time for holding the suspect in custody. 
(2) In making an application under subsection (1), the police officer shall specify— 
  (a) the nature of the offence for which the suspect has been arrested; 
 (b) the general nature of the evidence on which the suspect has been arrested;  
 (c) the inquiries that have been made by the police in relation to the offence and any further 
inquiries proposed to be made by the police; and  
 (d) the reasons necessitating the continued holding of the suspect in custody, and shall be 
supported by an affidavit.  
 (3) A Court shall not hear an application for extension of time under subsection (1)(b) unless the 
suspect has been served with a copy of the application. 
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This provision is not a carte blanche for illegal detention of suspects. It has inbuilt 
safeguards such as:  
 The officer must first produce the suspect before a court of law i.e. comply with 
the Constitution; 
  In his application, the officer must state the reasons necessitating the continued 
holding of the suspect.   
  A court shall not issue a remand order unless the suspect has been served with a 
copy of application.  
  A court will only issue a remand order if there are compelling reasons for 
issuance of the same.  
 The court orders cannot be issued in perpetuity as the suspect can only be held for 
up to a maximum of 90days, cumulatively.  
5. Terrorism Financing 
Terrorism financing and money laundering are related but they have different 
elements. Money laundering presumes that there is a crime which generates proceeds that 
have to be disguised to conceal the illicit source while in the case of terrorist financing 
money would be from either legitimate or illegal sources. Terrorism financing was not 
covered by the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2009, because 
terrorism was not an offence under Kenyan laws.  
However in the 2012 act, prohibition of terrorist financing is in line with the 
UNSC resolution 1566(2004) and the 1999 Suppression of Financing of Terrorism 
Convention. The imminent threat of being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF)/international community due to lack of legislation to criminalize terrorism and 
terrorist financing is over. Blacklisting would have placed the country in the same 
category as Iran and North Korea and would have had a devastating effect on the 
country’s economy, especially the financial sector. The country’s reputation in the 
international community would have been tarnished as it would have been viewed as a 
money laundering haven while transactions emanating from the country would have been 
treated with suspicion and subjected to extra vigilance. Correspondent banking 
relationships and growth of Kenyan banks to other regions would also have been severely 
curtailed while foreign investments into the country would have been severely eroded. 
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6. Communications Interception 
Section 36234 allows police officers to intercept conversations subject to approval 
of the high court. This provision is necessary because terrorism is a complex 
phenomenon often involving a chain of events and players at different stages. The 
provision is intended to make law enforcement agencies proactive as opposed to being 
reactive and hence pre-empt what the terrorists are planning. Interception is a law 
enforcement tool acceptable is most jurisdictions. However, the power to intercept is 
subject to administrative and judicial oversight in the Act and has the following inbuilt 
safeguards:  
 Written approval of the Inspector General or Director of Public Prosecutions must 
first be obtained 
  Not every officer can exercise this power – only an officer of or above the rank 
of chief inspector 
   It must be sanctioned by the court  
  It is limited only to the investigation of commission of offences under this act i.e. 
terror related offences and does not extend to other penal code offences  
  A court will not issue an interception order unless it is satisfied that the 
information sought relates to the commission of an offence under the act      
                                                 
234 Ibid., Section 36 state that: (1) Subject to subsection (2), a police officer of or above the rank of 
Chief Inspector of Police may, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offence under 
this Act, apply e x-parte, to High Court for an interception of communications order. 
 (2) A police officer shall not make an application under subsection (1) unless he has applied for 
and obtained the written consent of the Inspector-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
 (3) The Court may, in determining an application under subsection (1), make an order — (a) 
requiring a communications service provider to intercept and retain specified communication of a specified 
description received or transmitted, or about to be received or transmitted by that communications service 
provider; or(b) authorizing the police officer to enter any premises and to install on such premises, any 
device for the interception and retention of a specified communication and to remove and retain such 
device. 
 (4) The Court shall not make an order under subsection (3) unless it is satisfied that the 
information to be obtained relates to—(a) the commission of an offence under this Act; or(b) the 
whereabouts of the person suspected by the police officer to have committed the offence. 
 (5) Any information contained in a communication—(a) intercepted and retained pursuant to an 
order under subsection (3); or(b) shall subject to the provisions of any other written law, be admissible in 
proceedings for an offence under this Act; 
 (6) A police officer who intercepts communication other than is provided for under this Section 
commits an offence and shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or 
to a fine not exceeding five million shillings or to both. 
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The administrative and judicial oversight is intended to prevent the abuse of interceptions 
by rogue officers. The independent police oversight authority is also expected to address 
any grievances that may be raised on complaints regarding the abuse by police officers. 
Also, the fear that one may be falsely implicated by business or political rivals has been 
addressed by providing for stiff penalties (up to 20 years imprisonment) for giving false 
statements to the police under section 20.235 The interception of communication includes 
phone tapping, internet monitoring, and house bagging among other methods. This has 
been argued to violate the right to privacy.  
7. Fundamental Rights in relation to the constitution of Kenya 
As regards fundamental rights, the constitution is quite exhaustive and being the 
supreme law of the land, all other laws must be in tandem with the constitution to stand 
the test of constitutionalism. The rights and freedoms which have been limited in the 
2012 Act have all passed the test of Article 24 of the Constitution of Kenya which states 
that: 
(1) A right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights shall not 
be limited except by law, and then only to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including–– 
(a) the nature of the right or fundamental freedom; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and fundamental 
freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and 
fundamental freedoms of others; and 
(e) the relation between the limitation and its purpose and whether 
there are less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.236 
 
The act strives to adhere to constitutional norms and where there is a loop-hole it is 
covered by other existing laws. For instance, the right to a fair trial under Article 50 of 
                                                 
235 Ibid., section 20 states that: A person who, with intent to mislead an officer under this Act, makes a 
statement knowing the same to be false commits an offence and is liable, on conviction, to imprisonment 
for, a term not exceeding twenty years. 
236 The Constitution of Kenya 2010, article 24. 
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the constitution provides that a suspect be presented before court in 24 hours and the 
2012 Act has had to abide. A suspect can only be held beyond the 24 hours if there is a 
court order for remand or it is not practically possible to produce the suspect before the 
court.  
The Act has more safeguards through the criminal procedure code because a 
suspect who has been released under Section 32(2)237 of the 2012 act cannot be re-
arrested for the same offence unless there is a warrant of arrest in place and further 
evidence has come to light justifying the re-arrest.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The Republic of Kenya has progressed in its efforts to legislate terrorism from an 
oppressive colonial regime that installed laws without consultation to a democratic 
regime that seeks consultation and views from its citizens. The initial laws were heavy 
handed and had one aim of crushing the Mau Mau revolution. The legislation of 2003 had 
its own flaws, which encouraged the creation of a two-tier justice system whereby 
constitutional safeguards were completely negated. It sought to introduce a distinct 
system that only caters for terrorism offences such as arrests, detention, prosecution, and 
seizure of property and cash. The bill violated the rights of the individual and was 
inconsistent with international human rights norms. The 2012 Act on the other hand 
sought to fix these anomalies but has somehow left others undone. It is however a much 
improved legislation as compared to its predecessor more so because it addresses civil 
liberty concerns. The Act has also balanced national security and civil liberties where 
certain safeguards have been put in place to minimize the damage while protecting the 
people of Kenya.  
This chapter has demonstrated that the process of achieving acceptable terrorism 
legislation in a democratic society is slow. Even though a rise in security threats act as a 
                                                 
237  Prevention of terrorism Act 2012, section 32 (2) states that: (2) A police officer holding a suspect 
under subsection (1) may release that suspect at any time before the expiry of twenty four hours on 
condition that the suspect appears before the Court or such other place as may be specified, in writing, by 
the police officer and may, for this purpose, require the suspect to execute a bond of a reasonable sum on 
the suspect's own recognizance. 
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catalyst in speeding up the process, a compromise or a tradeoff must be achieved. At the 
moment, this balance has been achieved in Kenya. Kenyans seem to have accepted that in 
order to achieve a certain level of security; a certain amount of civil liberties must be 
compromised. The government on the other hand must show that safeguards are in place 
to cover the little flaws that still seem to violate civil liberties. The act has so far been 
received well without to much hullabaloo. It is however a matter of time whether the 
democratic principles that Kenya is trying to instill will hold. To implement this 
legislation, the criminal justice system has to be corruption free and adhere to the laid 
down regulations.  All in all the legislation makes Kenya a much safer place than before.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The 2012 legislation is no doubt an improvement and a step toward reducing acts 
of terror in Kenya. The process of legislating counterterrorism is slow even though the 
crime violates the most fundamental right—the right to life. The slow process is 
occasioned by the dilemma of response. States strive to safeguard the lives of those under 
their jurisdiction because a social contract exists. However, a problem arises when the 
law compels leaders to adhere to human-rights obligations while at the same time 
securing their citizens’ lives. The law also requires the measures implemented to fight 
terrorism comply with international human rights norms. At this point, the state falls back 
to its people for approval.  
In the case of the Republic of Kenya, the government’s early responses were not 
supported by the people. The proposed laws were rejected, even though Kenya was 
clearly susceptible to terror attacks, for several reasons: 
 First, past oppressive regimes (including British colonial rule) had set a precedent 
of heavy-handedness when dealing with acts of “terror,” including a readiness to 
reach almost immediately for oppressive and/or extra-judicial measures.  These 
measures also were extended to common, day-to-day crime and, of course, 
opponents of the ruling regime.  
 Second, civil liberties have been a concern in the past, especially in the regimes of 
President Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi.  Living memory in Kenya dictates 
that human rights and civil liberties remain central to any and all laws. 
 Third, the democratization process in Kenya after the post-election violence in 
2008 has been a major catalyst for change. Inherent safeguards in the 2010 
constitution seem to give confidence that the rule of law will thrive. 
These factors together provide the context for the ultimate failure of the 2003 
counterterrorism bill and the tentative success of the 2012 act. The laws that were 
acceptable to the people addressed most of the controversial clauses raised in earlier 
legislation. Some were accepted because of the safeguards in place, such as the 
introduction of the Supreme Court, the judicial oversight body, and the independent 
police oversight authority. These safeguards, especially in a democracy, are in place to 
check the criminal justice system.  
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This thesis has demonstrated that Kenya’s criminal justice system is well 
developed; however, when confronted with terrorism it has a tendency to violate basic 
civil liberties. The criminal justice system in Kenya has been static for a long time as 
opposed to the crime of terror that is ever evolving. Learning from the U.K., 
counterterrorism legislation evolves in tandem with the crime of terror. The U.K 
legislation has changed over time to cover new terrorist tactics there. Laws that seem 
overly harsh but must be part of the counterterrorism measures and are critical to civil 
liberty concerns are held in abeyance and have stringent conditions for activation.  
The process taken by the Republic of Kenya to enact the 2012 Act has been 
consultative, where a majority of the stakeholders was involved. However, it is critical 
that the remainder of controversial clauses be streamlined, more safeguards  put in place, 
and domestic court rulings upheld. The role of the court cannot be understated in shaping 
counterterrorism legislation. Unlike Kenya and other East African countries, the U.K is 
an established democracy that thrives on the rule of law. Court rulings are upheld and set 
precedence for any future litigation. In the case of Kenya it is hoped that the new judicial 
system will stand the test of time and will operate independently. 
The balance between the branches of the government plays a vital role in securing 
civil liberties. This thesis has demonstrated that the judiciary (like in the case of U.K.) is 
vital; the courts check and balance the process constantly; scrutinize all measures that are 
likely to infringe on civil liberties while at the same time authorises and reviews laws that 
are not in line with constitutional and human rights norms. The executive has powers that 
are either held in abeyance or are subject to parliamentary oversight. A good example in 
the U.K is the aspect of declaring an entity where discretionary factors have been set by 
Parliament and must be met before an organization is declared. 
In regard to Kenya’s neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania, the 
compatibility of civil liberties and counterterrorism legislation is still at question. This 
has the potential of undermining democratic principles gained over the years. It is 
therefore incumbent upon these states to balance the response with civil-liberty concerns, 
and more so to check executive powers, coupled with judicial and legislative oversight. 
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The preference for security over civil liberties has the tendency of leading states to other 
violations not related to terrorism. 
Finally, this thesis opines that a nuanced balance must be achieved between civil 
liberty and security. The measures implemented in Kenya will have an effect on civil 
liberties, however miniscule. This balance is hard to achieve but with mechanisms in 
place to check and countercheck security and other government apparatus, it is expected 
that civil-liberty concerns can be reduced. An area of future research in East Africa 
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